43.0QUANT-PHApr 22
Column Generation for the Optimization of Switching in Repeaterless Quantum NetworksÁlvaro Troyano Olivas, Andrés Agustí Casado, Hans H. Brunner et al.
Efficient resource allocation and optical switching promise high key rates, network adaptability, and cost reduction in repeaterless quantum communication networks. However, identifying optimal switching configurations remains a significant challenge due to the combinatorial complexity. We introduce a novel graph formulation to model the physical and logical structure of repeaterless quantum networks, enabling the systematic optimization of switching strategies. The problem is posed as a linear program and solved using a column generation approach. This method enables scalable computation despite the exponential number of possible network configurations. Our results not only provide a formal foundation but also a practical algorithm for the optimization of switching. Empirical tests confirm the solver's scalability with network size, demonstrating the framework's effectiveness and laying the groundwork for future optimization of quantum network control.
8.1QUANT-PHApr 7
The optical architecture of a heterogenous quantum network deployed in production facilitiesAlberto Sebastián-Lombraña, Hans H. Brunner, David Rincón et al.
Quantum Communications promise advances in cryptography, quantum computing and clock synchronisation, among other emerging applications. However, communication based on quantum phenomena requires an extreme level of isolation from external disturbances, complicating the co-propagation of quantum and classical signals. The challenge is greater when deploying networks that are both heterogeneous (e.g., multiple vendors) and installed in production facilities, given that this type of infrastructure already supports networks loaded with their own requirements. Moreover, to achieve a broad acceptance among network operators, the joint management and operation of quantum and classical resources, compliance with standards, and legal and quality assurance need to be addressed. This article presents solutions to the aforementioned challenges validated in the Madrid quantum network during the implementation of the projects CiViC and OpenQKD. This network was designed to integrate quantum communications in the telecommunications ecosystem by installing quantum-key-distribution modules from multiple providers in production nodes of two different operators. The modules were connected through an optically-switched network with more than 130~km of deployed optical fibre. The tests were done in compliance with strict service level agreements that protected the legacy traffic of the pre-existing classical network. The goal was to ensure full quantum-classical interoperability at all levels, while limiting the modifications to optical transport and encryption and complying with relevant standards. This effort is intended to lay the foundation for large-scale quantum network deployments.
2.9CRMar 14
Switching Coordinator: An SDN Application for Flexible QKD-NetworksRubén B. Mendez, Hans H. Brunner, Juan P. Brito et al.
A monitor and control framework for quantum-key-distribution (QKD) networks equipped with switching capabilities was developed. On the one hand, this framework provides real-time visibility into operational metrics. Specifically, it extracts essential data, such as the switching capabilities of QKD modules, the number of keys stored in buffer queues of the QKD links, and the respective key generation and consumption rates along these links. On the other hand, this framework allows software-defined networking (SDN) applications to operate on the collected information and address the cryptographic needs of the network. The SDN applications dynamically adapt the configuration of the switched network to align with its changing demands, e.g.,~prioritizing key availability on critical paths, responding to link failures, or reallocating generation capacity to prevent bottlenecks. This contribution demonstrates that the combination of switched QKD, centralized control, and global optimization strategies enables efficient, policy-driven operation of QKD networks. The cryptographic resources are allocated to maximize performance and resilience while remaining aligned with the specific policies set by network administrators.
NIJun 29, 2019
The Engineering of Software-Defined Quantum Key Distribution NetworksAlejandro Aguado, Victor Lopez, Diego Lopez et al.
Quantum computers will change the cryptographic panorama. A technology once believed to lay far away into the future is increasingly closer to real world applications. Quantum computers will break the algorithms used in our public key infrastructure and in our key exchange protocols, forcing a complete retooling of the cryptography as we know it. Quantum Key distribution is a physical layer technology immune to quantum or classical computational threats. However, it requires a physical substrate, and optical fiber has been the usual choice. Most of the time used just as a point to point link for the exclusive transport of the delicate quantum signals. Its integration in a real-world shared network has not been attempted so far. Here we show how the new programmable software network architectures, together with specially designed quantum systems can be used to produce a network that integrates classical and quantum communications, including management, in a single, production-level infrastructure. The network can also incorporate new quantum-safe algorithms and use the existing security protocols, thus bridging the gap between today's network security and the quantum-safe network of the future. This can be done in an evolutionary way, without zero-day migrations and the corresponding upfront costs. We also present how the technologies have been deployed in practice using a production network.
QUANT-PHSep 16, 2013
Quantum Metropolitan Optical Network based on Wavelength Division MultiplexingAlex Ciurana, Jesus Martinez-Mateo, Momtchil Peev et al.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is maturing quickly. However, the current approaches to its application in optical networks make it an expensive technology. QKD networks deployed to date are designed as a collection of point-to-point, dedicated QKD links where non-neighboring nodes communicate using the trusted repeater paradigm. We propose a novel optical network model in which QKD systems share the communication infrastructure by wavelength multiplexing their quantum and classical signals. The routing is done using optical components within a metropolitan area which allows for a dynamically any-to-any communication scheme. Moreover, it resembles a commercial telecom network, takes advantage of existing infrastructure and utilizes commercial components, allowing for an easy, cost-effective and reliable deployment.
QUANT-PHSep 3, 2012
Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authenticationChristoph Pacher, Aysajan Abidin, Thomas Lorünser et al.
We demonstrate how adversaries with unbounded computing resources can break Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols which employ a particular message authentication code suggested previously. This authentication code, featuring low key consumption, is not Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) since for each message the eavesdropper has intercepted she is able to send a different message from a set of messages that she can calculate by finding collisions of a cryptographic hash function. However, when this authentication code was introduced it was shown to prevent straightforward Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks against QKD protocols. In this paper, we prove that the set of messages that collide with any given message under this authentication code contains with high probability a message that has small Hamming distance to any other given message. Based on this fact we present extended MITM attacks against different versions of BB84 QKD protocols using the addressed authentication code; for three protocols we describe every single action taken by the adversary. For all protocols the adversary can obtain complete knowledge of the key, and for most protocols her success probability in doing so approaches unity. Since the attacks work against all authentication methods which allow to calculate colliding messages, the underlying building blocks of the presented attacks expose the potential pitfalls arising as a consequence of non-ITS authentication in QKD-postprocessing. We propose countermeasures, increasing the eavesdroppers demand for computational power, and also prove necessary and sufficient conditions for upgrading the discussed authentication code to the ITS level.