Shuchi Chawla

Shuchi Chawla, Kristin Sheridan

We consider the problem of finding the value of a maximum flow over time in a network with uniform edge lengths where the edge capacities change at specific time instants. To solve this problem, we show how to construct a condensed version of a Time Expanded Network (cTEN) whose standard max flow value is the same as the max flow over time on the original network. In particular, for a graph with $n$ nodes, $m$ edges, and $μ$ {\em critical times} where some edge capacity changes, we obtain a cTEN with $O(n^2μ)$ nodes and $O(μmn)$ edges. This implies that the problem can be solved in $O(μ^2n^3m)$ time using the combinatorial max flow algorithm of Orlin [Orl13], or in $O(μ^{(1+o(1))}(nm)^{1+o(1)}\log (UT))$ time using the algorithm of Chen et al. [CKL+22], where $U$ is the maximum capacity of any edge and $T$ is the time horizon. We focus on graphs that experience many time changes across the period of interest, as in such graphs the $μ$ term dominates the runtime.

Shuchi Chawla, Evangelia Gergatsouli, Jeremy McMahan et al.

We revisit the classic Pandora's Box (PB) problem under correlated distributions on the box values. Recent work of arXiv:1911.01632 obtained constant approximate algorithms for a restricted class of policies for the problem that visit boxes in a fixed order. In this work, we study the complexity of approximating the optimal policy which may adaptively choose which box to visit next based on the values seen so far. Our main result establishes an approximation-preserving equivalence of PB to the well studied Uniform Decision Tree (UDT) problem from stochastic optimization and a variant of the Min-Sum Set Cover ($\text{MSSC}_f$) problem. For distributions of support $m$, UDT admits a $\log m$ approximation, and while a constant factor approximation in polynomial time is a long-standing open problem, constant factor approximations are achievable in subexponential time (arXiv:1906.11385). Our main result implies that the same properties hold for PB and $\text{MSSC}_f$. We also study the case where the distribution over values is given more succinctly as a mixture of $m$ product distributions. This problem is again related to a noisy variant of the Optimal Decision Tree which is significantly more challenging. We give a constant-factor approximation that runs in time $n^{ \tilde O( m^2/\varepsilon^2 ) }$ when the mixture components on every box are either identical or separated in TV distance by $\varepsilon$.

Shuchi Chawla, Meena Jagadeesan

Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are guaranteed to produce fair outcomes. Following the works of Dwork and Ilvento (2019) and Chawla et al. (2020), our goal is to design a truthful auction that satisfies ``individual fairness'' in its outcomes: informally speaking, users that are similar to each other should obtain similar allocations of ads. Within this framework we quantify the tradeoff between social welfare maximization and fairness. This work makes two conceptual contributions. First, we express the fairness constraint as a kind of stability condition: any two users that are assigned multiplicatively similar values by all the advertisers must receive additively similar allocations for each advertiser. This value stability constraint is expressed as a function that maps the multiplicative distance between value vectors to the maximum allowable $\ell_{\infty}$ distance between the corresponding allocations. Standard auctions do not satisfy this kind of value stability. Second, we introduce a new class of allocation algorithms called Inverse Proportional Allocation that achieve a near optimal tradeoff between fairness and social welfare for a broad and expressive class of value stability conditions. These allocation algorithms are truthful and prior-free, and achieve a constant factor approximation to the optimal (unconstrained) social welfare. In particular, the approximation ratio is independent of the number of advertisers in the system. In this respect, these allocation algorithms greatly surpass the guarantees achieved in previous work. We also extend our results to broader notions of fairness that we call subset fairness.

Shuchi Chawla, Christina Ilvento, Meena Jagadeesan

Fairness in advertising is a topic of particular concern motivated by theoretical and empirical observations in both the computer science and economics literature. We examine the problem of fairness in advertising for general purpose platforms that service advertisers from many different categories. First, we propose inter-category and intra-category fairness desiderata that take inspiration from individual fairness and envy-freeness. Second, we investigate the "platform utility" (a proxy for the quality of the allocation) achievable by mechanisms satisfying these desiderata. More specifically, we compare the utility of fair mechanisms against the unfair optimal, and we show by construction that our fairness desiderata are compatible with utility. That is, we construct a family of fair mechanisms with high utility that perform close to optimally within a class of fair mechanisms. Our mechanisms also enjoy nice implementation properties including metric-obliviousness, which allows the platform to produce fair allocations without needing to know the specifics of the fairness requirements.

Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil Devanur, Janardhan Kulkarni et al.

We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to implement a truthful online mechanism for scheduling jobs so as to maximize the social welfare of the schedule. Recent work shows that under a stochastic assumption on job arrivals, there is a single-parameter family of mechanisms that achieves near-optimal social welfare. We show that given any such family of near-optimal online mechanisms, there exists an online mechanism that in the worst case performs nearly as well as the best of the given mechanisms. Our mechanism is truthful whenever the mechanisms in the given family are truthful and prompt, and achieves optimal (within constant factors) regret. We model the problem of competing against a family of online scheduling mechanisms as one of learning from expert advice. A primary challenge is that any scheduling decisions we make affect not only the payoff at the current step, but also the resource availability and payoffs in future steps. Furthermore, switching from one algorithm (a.k.a. expert) to another in an online fashion is challenging both because it requires synchronization with the state of the latter algorithm as well as because it affects the incentive structure of the algorithms. We further show how to adapt our algorithm to a non-clairvoyant setting where job lengths are unknown until jobs are run to completion. Once again, in this setting, we obtain truthfulness along with asymptotically optimal regret (within poly-logarithmic factors).