Qianying Zhang

CR
3papers
25citations
Novelty65%
AI Score26

3 Papers

CVJul 1, 2021
Intrinsic Image Transfer for Illumination Manipulation

Junqing Huang, Michael Ruzhansky, Qianying Zhang et al.

This paper presents a novel intrinsic image transfer (IIT) algorithm for illumination manipulation, which creates a local image translation between two illumination surfaces. This model is built on an optimization-based framework consisting of three photo-realistic losses defined on the sub-layers factorized by an intrinsic image decomposition. We illustrate that all losses can be reduced without the necessity of taking an intrinsic image decomposition under the well-known spatial-varying illumination illumination-invariant reflectance prior knowledge. Moreover, with a series of relaxations, all of them can be directly defined on images, giving a closed-form solution for image illumination manipulation. This new paradigm differs from the prevailing Retinex-based algorithms, as it provides an implicit way to deal with the per-pixel image illumination. We finally demonstrate its versatility and benefits to the illumination-related tasks such as illumination compensation, image enhancement, and high dynamic range (HDR) image compression, and show the high-quality results on natural image datasets.

CRAug 20, 2019
MicroTEE: Designing TEE OS Based on the Microkernel Architecture

Dongxu Ji, Qianying Zhang, Shijun Zhao et al.

ARM TrustZone technology is widely used to provide Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) for mobile devices. However, most TEE OSes are implemented as monolithic kernels. In such designs, device drivers, kernel services and kernel modules all run in the kernel, which results in large size of the kernel. It is difficult to guarantee that all components of the kernel have no security vulnerabilities in the monolithic kernel architecture, such as the integer overflow vulnerability in Qualcomm QSEE TrustZone and the TZDriver vulnerability in HUAWEI Hisilicon TEE architecture. This paper presents MicroTEE, a TEE OS based on the microkernel architecture. In MicroTEE, the microkernel provides strong isolation for TEE OS's basic services, such as crypto service and platform key management service. The kernel is only responsible for providing core services such as address space management, thread management, and inter-process communication. Other fundamental services, such as crypto service and platform key management service are implemented as applications at the user layer. Crypto Services and Key Management are used to provide Trusted Applications (TAs) with sensitive information encryption, data signing, and platform attestation functions. Our design avoids the compromise of the whole TEE OS if only one kernel service is vulnerable. A monitor has also been added to perform the switch between the secure world and the normal world. Finally, we implemented a MicroTEE prototype on the Freescale i.MX6Q Sabre Lite development board and tested its performance. Evaluation results show that the performance of cryptographic operations in MicroTEE is better than it in Linux when the size of data is small.

CRJun 16, 2019
A Comprehensive Formal Security Analysis and Revision of the Two-phase Key Exchange Primitive of TPM 2.0

Qianying Zhang, Shijun Zhao

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 2.0 provides a two-phase key exchange primitive which can be used to implement three widely-standardized authenticated key exchange protocols: the Full Unified Model, the Full MQV, and the SM2 key exchange protocols. However, vulnerabilities have been found in all of these protocols. Fortunately, it seems that the protections offered by TPM chips can mitigate these vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present a security model which captures TPM's protections on keys and protocols' computation environments and in which multiple protocols can be analyzed in a unified way. Based on the unified security model, we give the first formal security analysis of the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0, and the analysis results show that, with the help of hardware protections of TPM chips, the key exchange primitive indeed satisfies the well-defined security property of our security model, but unfortunately under some impractical limiting conditions, which would prevent the application of the key exchange primitive in real-world networks. To make TPM 2.0 applicable to real-world networks, we present a revision of the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0, which can be secure without the limiting conditions. We give a rigorous analysis of our revision, and the results show that our revision achieves not only the basic security property of modern AKE security models but also some further security properties.