Hugo J. Escalante Balderas

Mauricio Gonzalez Soto, David Danks, Hugo J. Escalante Balderas et al.

Decision-making under uncertainty and causal thinking are fundamental aspects of intelligent reasoning. Decision-making has been well studied when the available information is considered at the associative (probabilistic) level. The classical Theorems of von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage provide a formal criterion for rational choice using associative information: maximize expected utility. There is an ongoing debate around the origin of probabilities involved in such calculation. In this work, we will show how the probabilities for decision-making can be grounded in causal models by considering decision problems in which the available actions and consequences are causally connected. In this setting, actions are regarded as an intervention over a causal model. Then, we extend a previous causal decision-making result, which relies on a known causal model, to the case in which the causal mechanism that controls some environment is unknown to a rational decision-maker. In this way, action-outcome probabilities can be grounded in causal models in known and unknown cases. Finally, as an application, we extend the well-known concept of Nash Equilibrium to the case in which the players of a strategic game consider causal information.

Mauricio Gonzalez-Soto, Ivan R. Feliciano-Avelino, L. Enrique Sucar et al.

A Random Graph is a random object which take its values in the space of graphs. We take advantage of the expressibility of graphs in order to model the uncertainty about the existence of causal relationships within a given set of variables. We adopt a Bayesian point of view in order to capture a causal structure via interaction and learning with a causal environment. We test our method over two different scenarios, and the experiments mainly confirm that our technique can learn a causal structure. Furthermore, the experiments and results presented for the first test scenario demonstrate the usefulness of our method to learn a causal structure as well as the optimal action. On the other hand the second experiment, shows that our proposal manages to learn the underlying causal structure of several tasks with different sizes and different causal structures.

Mauricio Gonzalez Soto, David Danks, Hugo J. Escalante Balderas et al.

Decision-making under uncertainty and causal thinking are fundamental aspects of intelligent reasoning. Decision-making has been well studied when the available information is considered at the associative (probabilistic) level. The classical Theorems of von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage provide a formal criterion for rational choice using associative information: maximize expected utility. There is an ongoing debate around the origin of probabilities involved in such calculation. In this work, we will show how the probabilities for decision-making can be grounded in causal models by considering decision problems in which the available actions and consequences are causally connected. In this setting, actions are regarded as an intervention over a causal model. Then, we extend a previous causal decision-making result, which relies on a known causal model, to the case in which the causal mechanism that controls some environment is unknown to a rational decision-maker. In this way, action-outcome probabilities can be grounded in causal models in known and unknown cases. Finally, as an application, we extend the well-known concept of Nash Equilibrium to the case in which the players of a strategic game consider causal information.