Benjamin Heymann

Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Benjamin Heymann, Maxime Vono et al.

We consider the dataset valuation problem, that is, the problem of quantifying the incremental gain, to some relevant pre-defined utility of a machine learning task, of aggregating an individual dataset to others. The Shapley value is a natural tool to perform dataset valuation due to its formal axiomatic justification, which can be combined with Monte Carlo integration to overcome the computational tractability challenges. Such generic approximation methods, however, remain expensive in some cases. In this paper, we exploit the knowledge about the structure of the dataset valuation problem to devise more efficient Shapley value estimators. We propose a novel approximation, referred to as discrete uniform Shapley, which is expressed as an expectation under a discrete uniform distribution with support of reasonable size. We justify the relevancy of the proposed framework via asymptotic and non-asymptotic theoretical guarantees and illustrate its benefits via an extensive set of numerical experiments.

Imad Aouali, Amine Benhalloum, Martin Bompaire et al.

Both in academic and industry-based research, online evaluation methods are seen as the golden standard for interactive applications like recommendation systems. Naturally, the reason for this is that we can directly measure utility metrics that rely on interventions, being the recommendations that are being shown to users. Nevertheless, online evaluation methods are costly for a number of reasons, and a clear need remains for reliable offline evaluation procedures. In industry, offline metrics are often used as a first-line evaluation to generate promising candidate models to evaluate online. In academic work, limited access to online systems makes offline metrics the de facto approach to validating novel methods. Two classes of offline metrics exist: proxy-based methods, and counterfactual methods. The first class is often poorly correlated with the online metrics we care about, and the latter class only provides theoretical guarantees under assumptions that cannot be fulfilled in real-world environments. Here, we make the case that simulation-based comparisons provide ways forward beyond offline metrics, and argue that they are a preferable means of evaluation.

Imad Aouali, Flavian Vasile, Otmane Sakhi et al.

LLM recommendation agents increasingly produce structured recommendation reports: sets of items accompanied by natural-language justifications. Yet existing evaluations often reduce this setting to reranking small shortlisted candidate sets or judge reports mainly by semantic plausibility. We introduce Recommendation Atlas (Agentic Tool-Level Assessment for Shopping), or RecoAtlas, a benchmark and toolkit for evaluating shopping agents with behavior-grounded metrics. RecoAtlas complements held-out interaction metrics with learned utility proxies for relevance, complementarity, and diversity derived from interaction data, while separately measuring semantic coherence and explanation quality. Its controlled tool environment exposes agents to either semantic, behavior-aligned, or faulty tools, enabling diagnosis of whether performance gains arise from stronger reasoning, better signals, or more effective tool-use policies. Across controlled experiments, we show that RecoAtlas exhibits key properties of a meaningful benchmark for agentic systems: performance scales with model capacity and test-time compute, improves with stronger and better-aligned tools, degrades under noisy or misaligned signals, and reveals that semantic plausibility does not necessarily capture behavior-grounded utility. RecoAtlas provides a foundation for developing and evaluating shopping assistants that optimize not only for plausible recommendations, but also for coherent, behaviorally grounded recommendation sets.

Benjamin Heymann, Otmane Sakhi

We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the time elapsed since their last successful bid, with auctions arriving in continuous time and only aggregated feedback revealed at the end of the horizon. Such a bidder must (1) balance the immediate benefit of winning the current auction against its impact on future values and (2) learn unknown environmental parameters. We derive regret bounds for a class of learning methods that combine plug-in estimators with a differential-equation characterization of the optimal policy, and show that a specific confidence bound algorithm learns the optimal policy with a near optimal regret of $\widetilde{O}(\log N)$ for piecewise linear primitives, and $\widetilde{O}(N^{1/3})$ for general, smooth primitives, achieving these regrets without explicit randomization. These theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments.

Benjamin Heymann, Rémi Chan--Renous-Legoubin, Alexandre Gilotte

Online advertising banners are sold in real-time through auctions.Typically, the more banners a user is shown, the smaller the marginalvalue of the next banner for this user is. This fact can be detected bybasic ML models, that can be used to predict how previously won auctionsdecrease the current opportunity value. However, learning is not enough toproduce a bid that correctly accounts for how winning the current auctionimpacts the future values. Indeed, a policy that uses this prediction tomaximize the expected payoff of the current auction could be dubbedimpatient because such policy does not fully account for the repeatednature of the auctions. Under this perspective, it seems that most biddersin the literature are impatient. Unsurprisingly, impatience induces a cost.We provide two empirical arguments for the importance of this cost ofimpatience. First, an offline counterfactual analysis and, second, a notablebusiness metrics improvement by mitigating the cost of impatience withpolicy learning

Benjamin Heymann, Panayotis Mertikopoulos

This study concerns the computation of the Nash equilibria of first-price auctions with correlated values. Although some equilibrium computation methods exist for auctions with independent values, the correlation of bidders' values introduces significant complications that render the existing methods unsatisfactory. Our empirical contribution is a step towards filling this gap. We report surprisingly good numerical convergence of Fictitious Play toward an $\varepsilon$-equilibrium for an extensive set of instances. By doing so, we extend the insights of [39] to the correlated setting. These preliminary results call for further investigations into the properties of fictitious play algorithms on first-price auctions. 1. since the context is clear, we will use the term Nash equilibrium, or just equilibrium in this article

Artem Betlei, Mariia Vladimirova, Mehdi Sebbar et al.

The effectiveness of advertising in e-commerce largely depends on the ability of merchants to bid on and win impressions for their targeted users. The bidding procedure is highly complex due to various factors such as market competition, user behavior, and the diverse objectives of advertisers. In this paper we consider the problem at the level of user timelines instead of individual bid requests, manipulating full policies (i.e. pre-defined bidding strategies) and not bid values. In order to optimally allocate policies to users, typical multiple treatments allocation methods solve knapsack-like problems which aim at maximizing an expected value under constraints. In the industrial contexts such as online advertising, we argue that optimizing for the probability of success is a more suited objective than expected value maximization, and we introduce the SuccessProbaMax algorithm that aims at finding the policy allocation which is the most likely to outperform a fixed reference policy. Finally, we conduct comprehensive experiments both on synthetic and real-world data to evaluate its performance. The results demonstrate that our proposed algorithm outperforms conventional expected-value maximization algorithms in terms of success rate.

Alexandre Gilotte, Otmane Sakhi, Imad Aouali et al.

In production systems, contextual bandit approaches often rely on direct reward models that take both action and context as input. However, these models can suffer from confounding, making it difficult to isolate the effect of the action from that of the context. We present \emph{Counterfactual Sample Identification}, a new approach that re-frames the problem: rather than predicting reward, it learns to recognize which action led to a successful (binary) outcome by comparing it to a counterfactual action sampled from the logging policy under the same context. The method is theoretically grounded and consistently outperforms direct models in both synthetic experiments and real-world deployments.

Benjamin Heymann, Otmane Sakhi

We consider the problem of directly optimizing a non-linear function of an outcome, where this outcome itself is the sum of many small contributions. The non-linearity of the function means that the problem is not equivalent to the maximization of the expectation of the individual contribution. By leveraging the concentration properties of the sum of individual outcomes, we derive a scalable descent algorithm that directly optimizes for our stated objective. This allows for instance to maximize the probability of successful A/B test, for which it can be wiser to target a success criterion, such as exceeding a given uplift, rather than chasing the highest expected payoff.

Benjamin Heymann

AI alignment, the challenge of ensuring AI systems act in accordance with human values, has emerged as a critical problem in the development of systems such as foundation models and recommender systems. Still, the current dominant approach, reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) faces known theoretical limitations in aggregating diverse human preferences. Social choice theory provides a framework to aggregate preferences, but was not developed for the multidimensional applications typical of AI. Leveraging insights from a recently published urn process, this work introduces a preference aggregation strategy that adapts to the user's context and that inherits the good properties of the maximal lottery, a Condorcet-consistent solution concept.

Mélissa Tamine, Benjamin Heymann, Patrick Loiseau et al.

Semivalue-based data valuation uses cooperative-game theory intuitions to assign each data point a value reflecting its contribution to a downstream task. Still, those values depend on the practitioner's choice of utility, raising the question: How robust is semivalue-based data valuation to changes in the utility? This issue is critical when the utility is set as a trade-off between several criteria and when practitioners must select among multiple equally valid utilities. We address it by introducing the notion of a dataset's spatial signature: given a semivalue, we embed each data point into a lower-dimensional space where any utility becomes a linear functional, making the data valuation framework amenable to a simpler geometric picture. Building on this, we propose a practical methodology centered on an explicit robustness metric that informs practitioners whether and by how much their data valuation results will shift as the utility changes. We validate this approach across diverse datasets and semivalues, demonstrating strong agreement with rank-correlation analyses and offering analytical insight into how choosing a semivalue can amplify or diminish robustness.