Shima Sadat Mousavi

Pol Mestres, Shima Sadat Mousavi, Pio Ong et al.

This paper studies the efficient implementation of safety filters that are designed using control barrier functions (CBFs), which minimally modify a nominal controller to render it safe with respect to a prescribed set of states. Although CBF-based safety filters are often implemented by solving a quadratic program (QP) in real time, the use of off-the-shelf solvers for such optimization problems poses a challenge in applications where control actions need to be computed efficiently at very high frequencies. In this paper, we introduce a closed-form expression for controllers obtained through CBF-based safety filters. This expression is obtained by partitioning the state-space into different regions, with a different closed-form solution in each region. We leverage this formula to introduce a resource-aware implementation of CBF-based safety filters that detects changes in the partition region and uses the closed-form expression between changes. We showcase the applicability of our approach in examples ranging from aerospace control to safe reinforcement learning.

Shima Sadat Mousavi, Pol Mestres, Aaron D. Ames

Control barrier function (CBF)-QP safety filters enforce safety by minimally modifying a nominal controller. While prior work has mainly addressed robustness of safety under uncertainty, robustness of the resulting closed-loop \emph{stability} is much less understood. This issue is important because once the safety filter becomes active, it modifies the nominal dynamics and can reduce stability margins or even destabilize the system, despite preserving safety. For linear systems with a single affine safety constraint, we show that the active-mode dynamics admit an exact scalar loop representation, leading to a classical robust-control interpretation in terms of gain, phase, and delay margins. This viewpoint yields exact stability-margin characterizations and tractable linear matrix inequality (LMI)-based certificates and synthesis conditions for controllers with certified robustness guarantees. Numerical examples illustrate the proposed analysis and the enlargement of certified stability margins for safety-filtered systems.

Shima Sadat Mousavi, Max H. Cohen, Pol Mestres et al.

Safety filters based on control barrier functions (CBFs) and high-order control barrier functions (HOCBFs) are often implemented through quadratic programs (QPs). In general, especially in the presence of multiple constraints, feasibility is difficult to certify before solving the QP and may be lost as the state evolves. This paper addresses this issue for linear time-invariant (LTI) systems with affine safety constraints. Exploiting the resulting geometry of the constraint normals, and considering both unbounded and bounded inputs, we characterize feasibility for several structured classes of constraints. For certain such cases, we also derive closed-form safety filters. These explicit filters avoid online optimization and provide a simple alternative to QP-based implementations. Numerical examples illustrate the results.

Andrea Censi, Saverio Bolognani, Julian G. Zilly et al.

We present a new type of coordination mechanism among multiple agents for the allocation of a finite resource, such as the allocation of time slots for passing an intersection. We consider the setting where we associate one counter to each agent, which we call karma value, and where there is an established mechanism to decide resource allocation based on agents exchanging karma. The idea is that agents might be inclined to pass on using resources today, in exchange for karma, which will make it easier for them to claim the resource use in the future. To understand whether such a system might work robustly, we only design the protocol and not the agents' policies. We take a game-theoretic perspective and compute policies corresponding to Nash equilibria for the game. We find, surprisingly, that the Nash equilibria for a society of self-interested agents are very close in social welfare to a centralized cooperative solution. These results suggest that many resource allocation problems can have a simple, elegant, and robust solution, assuming the availability of a karma accounting mechanism.