Daniël Reijsbergen

Stefanos Leonardos, Barnabé Monnot, Daniël Reijsbergen et al.

Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees as well as other inefficiencies. EIP-1559 is a recent, improved proposal that introduces a number of innovative features such as a dynamically adaptive base fee that is burned, instead of being paid to the miners. Despite intense interest in understanding its properties, several basic questions such as whether and under what conditions does this protocol self-stabilize have remained elusive thus far. We perform a thorough analysis of the resulting fee market dynamic mechanism via a combination of tools from game theory and dynamical systems. We start by providing bounds on the step-size of the base fee update rule that suffice for global convergence to equilibrium via Lyapunov arguments. In the negative direction, we show that for larger step-sizes instability and even formally chaotic behavior are possible under a wide range of settings. We complement these qualitative results with quantitative bounds on the resulting range of base fees. We conclude our analysis with a thorough experimental case study that corroborates our theoretical findings.

Pieter Hartel, Ivan Homoliak, Daniël Reijsbergen

Since it takes time and effort to put a new product or service on the market, one would like to predict whether it will be a success. In general this is not possible, but it is possible to follow best practices in order to maximise the chance of success. A smart contract is intended to encode business logic and is therefore at the heart of every new business on the Ethereum blockchain. We have investigated how to measure the success of smart contracts, and whether successful smart contracts have characteristics that less successful smart contracts lack. The appearance of a smart contract on a listing website such as Etherscan or StateoftheDapps is such a characteristic. In this paper, we present a three-pronged analysis of the relative success of listed smart contracts. First, we have used statistical analysis on the publicly visible transaction history of the Ethereum blockchain to determine that listed contracts are significantly more successful than their unlisted counterparts. Next, we have conducted a survey among more than 200 developers via an anonymous online survey about their experience with the listing process. A significant majority of respondents do not believe that listing a contract itself contributes to its success, but they believe that the extra attention that is typically paid in tandem with the listing process does contribute. Finally, based on the respondents' answers, we have drafted 10 recommendations for developers and validated them by submitting them to an international panel of experts.

Daniël Reijsbergen, Rajeev Ratan

We propose a data-driven methodology for evaluating the impact of the introduction of a speed limit on the punctuality of bus services. In particular, we use high-frequency Automatic Vehicle Location data to parameterise a model that represents the movement of a bus along predefined patches of the route. We fit the probability distributions of the time spent in each patch to two classes of probability distributions: hyper-Erlang distributions, for which we use the tool HyperStar, and a variation of the three-parameter gamma distributions recommended by the Traffic Engineering Handbook. In both cases we obtain models that can be expressed using the framework of Probabilistic Timed Automata, allowing us to evaluate bus punctuality using the model checking tool UPPAAL. We conduct a case study involving a proposed speed limit in Edinburgh. This is an extended version of a paper presented at ValueTools 2015.