Roberta de Viti

Leonardo Kuffo, Ioanna Tsakalidou, Roberta De Viti et al.

We introduce Semantic Recall, a novel metric to assess the quality of approximate nearest neighbor search algorithms by considering only semantically relevant objects that are theoretically retrievable via exact nearest neighbor search. Unlike traditional recall, semantic recall does not penalize algorithms for failing to retrieve objects that are semantically irrelevant to the query, even if those objects are among their nearest neighbors. We demonstrate that semantic recall is particularly useful for assessing retrieval quality on queries that have few relevant results among their nearest neighbors-a scenario we uncover to be common within embedding datasets. Additionally, we introduce Tolerant Recall, a proxy metric that approximates semantic recall when semantically relevant objects cannot be identified. We empirically show that our metrics are more effective indicators of retrieval quality, and that optimizing search algorithms for these metrics can lead to improved cost-quality tradeoffs.

Aastha Mehta, Mohamed Alzayat, Roberta de Viti et al.

Network side channels (NSCs) leak secrets through packet timing and packet sizes. They are of particular concern in public IaaS Clouds, where any tenant may be able to colocate and indirectly observe a victim's traffic shape. We present Pacer, the first system that eliminates NSC leaks in public IaaS Clouds end-to-end. It builds on the principled technique of shaping guest traffic outside the guest to make the traffic shape independent of secrets by design. However, Pacer also addresses important concerns that have not been considered in prior work -- it prevents internal side-channel leaks from affecting reshaped traffic, and it respects network flow control, congestion control and loss recovery signals. Pacer is implemented as a paravirtualizing extension to the host hypervisor, requiring modest changes to the hypervisor and the guest kernel, and only optional, minimal changes to applications. We present Pacer's key abstraction of a cloaked tunnel, describe its design and implementation, prove the security of important design aspects through a formal model, and show through an experimental evaluation that Pacer imposes moderate overheads on bandwidth, client latency, and server throughput, while thwarting attacks based on state-of-the-art CNN classifiers.