Bodhayan Roy

Satyabrata Jana, Debabrata Pal, Bodhayan Roy et al.

We study the Witness Set problem, a natural dual to the classical Art Gallery problem. In the Witness Set problem, we are given a polygon $P$ and an integer $k$ as input, and the objective is to determine whether $P$ has a witness set of size at least $k$. A point set $X$ in $P$ is called a witness set if every point in $P$ is visible from at most one point in $X$. For simple polygons, we show that Witness Set lies in both $NP$ and $XP$. This stands in sharp contrast to its dual, the Art Gallery problem, which was recently shown to be $\exists \mathbb{R}$-complete by Abrahamsen et al. and is therefore neither in $NP$ nor admits a polynomial-size discretization unless $NP=\exists \mathbb{R}$. In contrast, we prove that Witness Set for simple polygons admits a finite discretization of size $n^{f(k)}$ for some function $f$. For comparison, even for simple polygons, Efrat and Har-Peled gave an algorithm for Art Gallery running in time $n^{O(k)}$ using tools from real algebraic geometry, and it appears difficult to obtain such algorithms without this machinery. On the other hand, our approach for Witness Set is purely combinatorial and relies on discretization, leading to an $n^{f(k)}$-time algorithm. Although Amit et al. claimed more than fifteen years ago that Witness Set is $NP$-hard, no proof or reference was provided. We show that the discrete version of the Witness Set problem - where the witness set must be chosen from a given finite point set $Q$ (instead of allowing witnesses to be chosen anywhere in the polygon), referred to as Discrete Witness Set - is $NP$-complete, even when the input is restricted to rectilinear polygons with holes. However, for simple polygons, Discrete Witness Set admits a polynomial-time algorithm by Das et al. Thus, it remains an open question whether the Witness Set problem is $NP$-hard.

Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui

This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional settings are not merely of theoretical interest but are central to many real-world applications. For example, cloud computing resources are evaluated based on multiple criteria such as CPU cores, memory, and network bandwidth. In such cases, traditional one dimensional fairness notions fail to capture fairness across multiple attributes. To address these challenges, we study two relaxed variants of envy-freeness: weak simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (weak sEFc) and strong simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (strong sEFc), which accommodate the multidimensionality of agents' preferences. Under the weak notion, for every pair of agents and for each dimension, any perceived envy can be eliminated by removing, if necessary, a different set of goods from the envied agent's allocation. In contrast, the strong version requires selecting a single set of goods whose removal from the envied bundle simultaneously eliminates envy in every dimension. We provide upper and lower bounds on the relaxation parameter c that guarantee the existence of weak or strong sEFc allocations, where these bounds are independent of the total number of items. In addition, we present algorithms for checking whether a weak or strong sEFc allocation exists. Moreover, we establish NP-hardness results for checking the existence of weak sEF1 and strong sEF1 allocations.

Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui

A Latin square is an $n \times n$ matrix filled with $n$ distinct symbols, each of which appears exactly once in each row and exactly once in each column. We introduce a problem of allocating $n$ indivisible items among $n$ agents over $n$ rounds while satisfying the Latin square constraint. This constraint ensures that each agent receives no more than one item per round and receives each item at most once. Each agent has an additive valuation on the item--round pairs. Real-world applications like scheduling, resource management, and experimental design require the Latin square constraint to satisfy fairness or balancedness in allocation. Our goal is to find a partial or complete allocation that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations (utilitarian social welfare) or the minimum of the agents' valuations (egalitarian social welfare). For the problem of maximizing utilitarian social welfare, we prove NP-hardness even when the valuations are binary additive. We then provide $(1-1/e)$ and $(1-1/e)/4$-approximation algorithms for partial and complete settings, respectively. Additionally, we present fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithms with respect to the order of Latin square and the optimum value for both partial and complete settings. For the problem of maximizing egalitarian social welfare, we establish that deciding whether the optimum value is at most $1$ or at least $2$ is NP-hard for both the partial and complete settings, even when the valuations are binary. Furthermore, we demonstrate that checking the existence of a complete allocation that satisfies each of envy-free, proportional, equitable, envy-free up to any good, proportional up to any good, or equitable up to any good is NP-hard, even when the valuations are identical.