Sarwar Sayeed

2papers

2 Papers

CRDec 6, 2021
PAN-DOMAIN: Privacy-preserving Sharing and Auditing of Infection Identifier Matching

William Abramson, William J. Buchanan, Sarwar Sayeed et al.

The spread of COVID-19 has highlighted the need for a robust contact tracing infrastructure that enables infected individuals to have their contacts traced, and followed up with a test. The key entities involved within a contact tracing infrastructure may include the Citizen, a Testing Centre (TC), a Health Authority (HA), and a Government Authority (GA). Typically, these different domains need to communicate with each other about an individual. A common approach is when a citizen discloses his personally identifiable information to both the HA a TC, if the test result comes positive, the information is used by the TC to alert the HA. Along with this, there can be other trusted entities that have other key elements of data related to the citizen. However, the existing approaches comprise severe flaws in terms of privacy and security. Additionally, the aforementioned approaches are not transparent and often being questioned for the efficacy of the implementations. In order to overcome the challenges, this paper outlines the PAN-DOMAIN infrastructure that allows for citizen identifiers to be matched amongst the TA, the HA and the GA. PAN-DOMAIN ensures that the citizen can keep control of the mapping between the trusted entities using a trusted converter, and has access to an audit log.

CRSep 20, 2019
Performance Analysis of TLS for Quantum Robust Cryptography on a Constrained Device

Jon Barton, William J Buchanan, Nikolaos Pitropakis et al.

Advances in quantum computing make Shor's algorithm for factorising numbers ever more tractable. This threatens the security of any cryptographic system which often relies on the difficulty of factorisation. It also threatens methods based on discrete logarithms, such as with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. For a cryptographic system to remain secure against a quantum adversary, we need to build methods based on a hard mathematical problem, which are not susceptible to Shor's algorithm and which create Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC). While high-powered computing devices may be able to run these new methods, we need to investigate how well these methods run on limited powered devices. This paper outlines an evaluation framework for PQC within constrained devices, and contributes to the area by providing benchmarks of the front-running algorithms on a popular single-board low-power device.