Natalie Collina

Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Sampath Kannan et al.

There has been substantial recent concern that pricing algorithms might learn to ``collude.'' Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish their competitors who refuse to support high prices, and these strategies can be automatically learned. In fact, a standard economic intuition is that supra-competitive prices emerge from either the use of threats, or a failure of one party to optimize their payoff. Is this intuition correct? Would preventing threats in algorithmic decision-making prevent supra-competitive prices when sellers are optimizing for their own revenue? No. We show that supra-competitive prices can emerge even when both players are using algorithms which do not encode threats, and which optimize for their own revenue. We study sequential pricing games in which a first mover deploys an algorithm and then a second mover optimizes within the resulting environment. We show that if the first mover deploys any algorithm with a no-regret guarantee, and then the second mover even approximately optimizes within this now static environment, monopoly-like prices arise. The result holds for any no-regret learning algorithm deployed by the first mover and for any pricing policy of the second mover that obtains them profit at least as high as a random pricing would -- and hence the result applies even when the second mover is optimizing only within a space of non-responsive pricing distributions which are incapable of encoding threats. In fact, there exists a set of strategies, neither of which explicitly encode threats that form a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous pricing game in algorithm space, and lead to near monopoly prices. This suggests that the definition of ``algorithmic collusion'' may need to be expanded, to include strategies without explicitly encoded threats.

Natalie Collina, Jiuyao Lu, Georgy Noarov et al.

We prove tight lower bounds for online multicalibration, establishing an information-theoretic separation from marginal calibration. In the general setting where group functions can depend on both context and the learner's predictions, we prove an $Ω(T^{2/3})$ lower bound on expected multicalibration error using just three disjoint binary groups. This matches the upper bounds of Noarov et al. (2025) up to logarithmic factors and exceeds the $O(T^{2/3-\varepsilon})$ upper bound for marginal calibration (Dagan et al., 2025), thereby separating the two problems. We then turn to lower bounds for the more difficult case of group functions that may depend on context but not on the learner's predictions. In this case, we establish an $\widetildeΩ(T^{2/3})$ lower bound for online multicalibration via a $Θ(T)$-sized group family constructed using orthogonal function systems, again matching upper bounds up to logarithmic factors.

Natalie Collina, Jiuyao Lu, Georgy Noarov et al.

We study the minimax sample complexity of multicalibration in the batch setting. A learner observes $n$ i.i.d. samples from an unknown distribution and must output a (possibly randomized) predictor whose population multicalibration error, measured by Expected Calibration Error (ECE), is at most $\varepsilon$ with respect to a given family of groups. For every fixed $κ> 0$, in the regime $|G|\le \varepsilon^{-κ}$, we prove that $\widetildeΘ(\varepsilon^{-3})$ samples are necessary and sufficient, up to polylogarithmic factors. The lower bound holds even for randomized predictors, and the upper bound is realized by a randomized predictor obtained via an online-to-batch reduction. This separates the sample complexity of multicalibration from that of marginal calibration, which scales as $\widetildeΘ(\varepsilon^{-2})$, and shows that mean-ECE multicalibration is as difficult in the batch setting as it is in the online setting, in contrast to marginal calibration which is strictly more difficult in the online setting. In contrast we observe that for $κ= 0$, the sample complexity of multicalibration remains $\widetildeΘ(\varepsilon^{-2})$ exhibiting a sharp threshold phenomenon. More generally, we establish matching upper and lower bounds, up to polylogarithmic factors, for a weighted $L_p$ multicalibration metric for all $1 \le p \le 2$, with optimal exponent $3/p$. We also extend the lower-bound template to a regular class of elicitable properties, and combine it with the online upper bounds of Hu et al. (2025) to obtain matching bounds for calibrating properties including expectiles and bounded-density quantiles.

Natalie Collina, Ira Globus-Harris, Surbhi Goel et al.

We give efficient "collaboration protocols" through which two parties, who observe different features about the same instances, can interact to arrive at predictions that are more accurate than either could have obtained on their own. The parties only need to iteratively share and update their own label predictions-without either party ever having to share the actual features that they observe. Our protocols are efficient reductions to the problem of learning on each party's feature space alone, and so can be used even in settings in which each party's feature space is illegible to the other-which arises in models of human/AI interaction and in multi-modal learning. The communication requirements of our protocols are independent of the dimensionality of the data. In an online adversarial setting we show how to give regret bounds on the predictions that the parties arrive at with respect to a class of benchmark policies defined on the joint feature space of the two parties, despite the fact that neither party has access to this joint feature space. We also give simpler algorithms for the same task in the batch setting in which we assume that there is a fixed but unknown data distribution. We generalize our protocols to a decision theoretic setting with high dimensional outcome spaces, where parties communicate only "best response actions." Our theorems give a computationally and statistically tractable generalization of past work on information aggregation amongst Bayesians who share a common and correct prior, as part of a literature studying "agreement" in the style of Aumann's agreement theorem. Our results require no knowledge of (or even the existence of) a prior distribution and are computationally efficient. Nevertheless we show how to lift our theorems back to this classical Bayesian setting, and in doing so, give new information aggregation theorems for Bayesian agreement.

Natalie Collina, Surbhi Goel, Varun Gupta et al.

We present an efficient reduction that converts any machine learning algorithm into an interactive protocol, enabling collaboration with another party (e.g., a human) to achieve consensus on predictions and improve accuracy. This approach imposes calibration conditions on each party, which are computationally and statistically tractable relaxations of Bayesian rationality. These conditions are sensible even in prior-free settings, representing a significant generalization of Aumann's classic "agreement theorem." In our protocol, the model first provides a prediction. The human then responds by either agreeing or offering feedback. The model updates its state and revises its prediction, while the human may adjust their beliefs. This iterative process continues until the two parties reach agreement. Initially, we study a setting that extends Aumann's Agreement Theorem, where parties aim to agree on a one-dimensional expectation by iteratively sharing their current estimates. Here, we recover the convergence theorem of Aaronson'05 under weaker assumptions. We then address the case where parties hold beliefs over distributions with d outcomes, exploring two feedback mechanisms. The first involves vector-valued estimates of predictions, while the second adopts a decision-theoretic approach: the human, needing to take an action from a finite set based on utility, communicates their utility-maximizing action at each round. In this setup, the number of rounds until agreement remains independent of d. Finally, we generalize to scenarios with more than two parties, where computational complexity scales linearly with the number of participants. Our protocols rely on simple, efficient conditions and produce predictions that surpass the accuracy of any individual party's alone.

Natalie Collina, Varun Gupta, Aaron Roth

We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst $k$ Agents at each of $T$ rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Principal induces a $T$-round extensive form game amongst the Agents. We give several results aimed at understanding an under-explored aspect of contract theory -- the game induced when choosing an Agent to contract with. First, we show that this game admits a pure-strategy \emph{non-responsive} equilibrium amongst the Agents -- informally an equilibrium in which the Agent's actions depend on the history of realized states of nature, but not on the history of each other's actions, and so avoids the complexities of collusion and threats. Next, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a \emph{monotone} bandit algorithm, then for any concave contract, in any such equilibrium, the Principal obtains no regret to contracting with the best Agent in hindsight -- not just given their realized actions, but also to the counterfactual world in which they had offered a guaranteed $T$-round contract to the best Agent in hindsight, which would have induced a different sequence of actions. Finally, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a monotone bandit algorithm which guarantees no swap-regret, then the Principal can additionally offer only limited liability contracts (in which the Agent never needs to pay the Principal) while getting no-regret to the counterfactual world in which she offered a linear contract to the best Agent in hindsight -- despite the fact that linear contracts are not limited liability. We instantiate this theorem by demonstrating the existence of a monotone no swap-regret bandit algorithm, which to our knowledge has not previously appeared in the literature.

Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Jon Schneider

We consider the problem of a learning agent who has to repeatedly play a general sum game against a strategic opponent who acts to maximize their own payoff by optimally responding against the learner's algorithm. The learning agent knows their own payoff function, but is uncertain about the payoff of their opponent (knowing only that it is drawn from some distribution $\mathcal{D}$). What learning algorithm should the agent run in order to maximize their own total utility, either in expectation or in the worst-case over $\mathcal{D}$? When the learning algorithm is constrained to be a no-regret algorithm, we demonstrate how to efficiently construct an optimal learning algorithm (asymptotically achieving the optimal utility) in polynomial time for both the in-expectation and worst-case problems, independent of any other assumptions. When the learning algorithm is not constrained to no-regret, we show how to construct an $\varepsilon$-optimal learning algorithm (obtaining average utility within $\varepsilon$ of the optimal utility) for both the in-expectation and worst-case problems in time polynomial in the size of the input and $1/\varepsilon$, when either the size of the game or the support of $\mathcal{D}$ is constant. Finally, for the special case of the maximin objective, where the learner wishes to maximize their minimum payoff over all possible optimizer types, we construct a learner algorithm that runs in polynomial time in each step and guarantees convergence to the optimal learner payoff. All of these results make use of recently developed machinery that converts the analysis of learning algorithms to the study of the class of corresponding geometric objects known as menus.

Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Yishay Mansour et al.

Swap regret is a notion that has proven itself to be central to the study of general-sum normal-form games, with swap-regret minimization leading to convergence to the set of correlated equilibria and guaranteeing non-manipulability against a self-interested opponent. However, the situation for more general classes of games -- such as Bayesian games and extensive-form games -- is less clear-cut, with multiple candidate definitions for swap-regret but no known efficiently minimizable variant of swap regret that implies analogous non-manipulability guarantees. In this paper, we present a new variant of swap regret for polytope games that we call ``profile swap regret'', with the property that obtaining sublinear profile swap regret is both necessary and sufficient for any learning algorithm to be non-manipulable by an opponent (resolving an open problem of Mansour et al., 2022). Although we show profile swap regret is NP-hard to compute given a transcript of play, we show it is nonetheless possible to design efficient learning algorithms that guarantee at most $O(\sqrt{T})$ profile swap regret. Finally, we explore the correlated equilibrium notion induced by low-profile-swap-regret play, and demonstrate a gap between the set of outcomes that can be implemented by this learning process and the set of outcomes that can be implemented by a third-party mediator (in contrast to the situation in normal-form games).

Natalie Collina, Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Meena Jagadeesan

AI agents are increasingly deployed in ecosystems where they repeatedly interact not only with each other but also with humans. In this work, we study these human-AI ecosystems from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the classical framework of repeated pricing games. In our stylized model, the AI agents play equilibrium strategies, and one or more humans manually perform the pricing task instead of adopting an AI agent, thereby defecting to a no-regret strategy. Motivated by how populations of AI agents can sustain supracompetitive prices, we investigate whether high prices persist under such defections. Our main finding is that even a single human defection can destabilize collusion and drive down prices, and multiple defections push prices even closer to competitive levels. We further show how the nature of collusion changes under defection-aware AI agents. Taken together, our results characterize when algorithmic collusion is fragile--and when it persists--in mixed ecosystems of AI agents and humans.

Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Aaron Roth et al.

Blasiok et al. [2023] proposed distance to calibration as a natural measure of calibration error that unlike expected calibration error (ECE) is continuous. Recently, Qiao and Zheng [2024] gave a non-constructive argument establishing the existence of an online predictor that can obtain $O(\sqrt{T})$ distance to calibration in the adversarial setting, which is known to be impossible for ECE. They leave as an open problem finding an explicit, efficient algorithm. We resolve this problem and give an extremely simple, efficient, deterministic algorithm that obtains distance to calibration error at most $2\sqrt{T}+1$.