Colin Rowat

ML
4papers
267citations
Novelty55%
AI Score27

4 Papers

LGSep 24, 2021
Interpretability in Safety-Critical FinancialTrading Systems

Gabriel Deza, Adelin Travers, Colin Rowat et al.

Sophisticated machine learning (ML) models to inform trading in the financial sector create problems of interpretability and risk management. Seemingly robust forecasting models may behave erroneously in out of distribution settings. In 2020, some of the world's most sophisticated quant hedge funds suffered losses as their ML models were first underhedged, and then overcompensated. We implement a gradient-based approach for precisely stress-testing how a trading model's forecasts can be manipulated, and their effects on downstream tasks at the trading execution level. We construct inputs -- whether in changes to sentiment or market variables -- that efficiently affect changes in the return distribution. In an industry-standard trading pipeline, we perturb model inputs for eight S&P 500 stocks. We find our approach discovers seemingly in-sample input settings that result in large negative shifts in return distributions. We provide the financial community with mechanisms to interpret ML forecasts in trading systems. For the security community, we provide a compelling application where studying ML robustness necessitates that one capture an end-to-end system's performance rather than study a ML model in isolation. Indeed, we show in our evaluation that errors in the forecasting model's predictions alone are not sufficient for trading decisions made based on these forecasts to yield a negative return.

MLJul 23, 2021
Joint Shapley values: a measure of joint feature importance

Chris Harris, Richard Pymar, Colin Rowat

The Shapley value is one of the most widely used measures of feature importance partly as it measures a feature's average effect on a model's prediction. We introduce joint Shapley values, which directly extend Shapley's axioms and intuitions: joint Shapley values measure a set of features' average contribution to a model's prediction. We prove the uniqueness of joint Shapley values, for any order of explanation. Results for games show that joint Shapley values present different insights from existing interaction indices, which assess the effect of a feature within a set of features. The joint Shapley values provide intuitive results in ML attribution problems. With binary features, we present a presence-adjusted global value that is more consistent with local intuitions than the usual approach.

MLOct 14, 2019
Asymmetric Shapley values: incorporating causal knowledge into model-agnostic explainability

Christopher Frye, Colin Rowat, Ilya Feige

Explaining AI systems is fundamental both to the development of high performing models and to the trust placed in them by their users. The Shapley framework for explainability has strength in its general applicability combined with its precise, rigorous foundation: it provides a common, model-agnostic language for AI explainability and uniquely satisfies a set of intuitive mathematical axioms. However, Shapley values are too restrictive in one significant regard: they ignore all causal structure in the data. We introduce a less restrictive framework, Asymmetric Shapley values (ASVs), which are rigorously founded on a set of axioms, applicable to any AI system, and flexible enough to incorporate any causal structure known to be respected by the data. We demonstrate that ASVs can (i) improve model explanations by incorporating causal information, (ii) provide an unambiguous test for unfair discrimination in model predictions, (iii) enable sequentially incremental explanations in time-series models, and (iv) support feature-selection studies without the need for model retraining.

MFNov 7, 2014
Budget Imbalance Criteria for Auctions: A Formalized Theorem

Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat

We present an original theorem in auction theory: it specifies general conditions under which the sum of the payments of all bidders is necessarily not identically zero, and more generally not constant. Moreover, it explicitly supplies a construction for a finite minimal set of possible bids on which such a sum is not constant. In particular, this theorem applies to the important case of a second-price Vickrey auction, where it reduces to a basic result of which a novel proof is given. To enhance the confidence in this new theorem, it has been formalized in Isabelle/HOL: the main results and definitions of the formal proof are re- produced here in common mathematical language, and are accompanied by an informal discussion about the underlying ideas.