Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı

Lois Orosa, Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı, Haocong Luo et al.

RowHammer is a circuit-level DRAM vulnerability where repeatedly accessing (i.e., hammering) a DRAM row can cause bit flips in physically nearby rows. The RowHammer vulnerability worsens as DRAM cell size and cell-to-cell spacing shrink. Recent studies demonstrate that modern DRAM chips, including chips previously marketed as RowHammer-safe, are even more vulnerable to RowHammer than older chips such that the required hammer count to cause a bit flip has reduced by more than 10X in the last decade. Therefore, it is essential to develop a better understanding and in-depth insights into the RowHammer vulnerability of modern DRAM chips to more effectively secure current and future systems. Our goal in this paper is to provide insights into fundamental properties of the RowHammer vulnerability that are not yet rigorously studied by prior works, but can potentially be $i$) exploited to develop more effective RowHammer attacks or $ii$) leveraged to design more effective and efficient defense mechanisms. To this end, we present an experimental characterization using 248~DDR4 and 24~DDR3 modern DRAM chips from four major DRAM manufacturers demonstrating how the RowHammer effects vary with three fundamental properties: 1)~DRAM chip temperature, 2)~aggressor row active time, and 3)~victim DRAM cell's physical location. Among our 16 new observations, we highlight that a RowHammer bit flip 1)~is very likely to occur in a bounded range, specific to each DRAM cell (e.g., 5.4% of the vulnerable DRAM cells exhibit errors in the range 70C to 90C), 2)~is more likely to occur if the aggressor row is active for longer time (e.g., RowHammer vulnerability increases by 36% if we keep a DRAM row active for 15 column accesses), and 3)~is more likely to occur in certain physical regions of the DRAM module under attack (e.g., 5% of the rows are 2x more vulnerable than the remaining 95% of the rows).

Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı, Jeremie S. Kim, Fabrice Devaux et al.

The purpose of this document is to study the security properties of the Silver Bullet algorithm against worst-case RowHammer attacks. We mathematically demonstrate that Silver Bullet, when properly configured and implemented in a DRAM chip, can securely prevent RowHammer attacks. The demonstration focuses on the most representative implementation of Silver Bullet, the patent claiming many implementation possibilities not covered in this demonstration. Our study concludes that Silver Bullet is a promising RowHammer prevention mechanism that can be configured to operate securely against RowHammer attacks at various efficiency-area tradeoff points, supporting relatively small hammer count values (e.g., 1000) and Silver Bullet table sizes (e.g., 1.06KB).

Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı, Minesh Patel, Jeremie S. Kim et al.

Aggressive memory density scaling causes modern DRAM devices to suffer from RowHammer, a phenomenon where rapidly activating a DRAM row can cause bit-flips in physically-nearby rows. Recent studies demonstrate that modern DRAM chips, including chips previously marketed as RowHammer-safe, are even more vulnerable to RowHammer than older chips. Many works show that attackers can exploit RowHammer bit-flips to reliably mount system-level attacks to escalate privilege and leak private data. Therefore, it is critical to ensure RowHammer-safe operation on all DRAM-based systems. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms face two major challenges. First, they incur increasingly higher performance and/or area overheads when applied to more vulnerable DRAM chips. Second, they require either proprietary information about or modifications to the DRAM chip design. In this paper, we show that it is possible to efficiently and scalably prevent RowHammer bit-flips without knowledge of or modification to DRAM internals. We introduce BlockHammer, a low-cost, effective, and easy-to-adopt RowHammer mitigation mechanism that overcomes the two key challenges by selectively throttling memory accesses that could otherwise cause RowHammer bit-flips. The key idea of BlockHammer is to (1) track row activation rates using area-efficient Bloom filters and (2) use the tracking data to ensure that no row is ever activated rapidly enough to induce RowHammer bit-flips. By doing so, BlockHammer (1) makes it impossible for a RowHammer bit-flip to occur and (2) greatly reduces a RowHammer attack's impact on the performance of co-running benign applications. Compared to state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms, BlockHammer provides competitive performance and energy when the system is not under a RowHammer attack and significantly better performance and energy when the system is under attack.

Skanda Koppula, Lois Orosa, Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı et al.

The effectiveness of deep neural networks (DNN) in vision, speech, and language processing has prompted a tremendous demand for energy-efficient high-performance DNN inference systems. Due to the increasing memory intensity of most DNN workloads, main memory can dominate the system's energy consumption and stall time. One effective way to reduce the energy consumption and increase the performance of DNN inference systems is by using approximate memory, which operates with reduced supply voltage and reduced access latency parameters that violate standard specifications. Using approximate memory reduces reliability, leading to higher bit error rates. Fortunately, neural networks have an intrinsic capacity to tolerate increased bit errors. This can enable energy-efficient and high-performance neural network inference using approximate DRAM devices. Based on this observation, we propose EDEN, a general framework that reduces DNN energy consumption and DNN evaluation latency by using approximate DRAM devices, while strictly meeting a user-specified target DNN accuracy. EDEN relies on two key ideas: 1) retraining the DNN for a target approximate DRAM device to increase the DNN's error tolerance, and 2) efficient mapping of the error tolerance of each individual DNN data type to a corresponding approximate DRAM partition in a way that meets the user-specified DNN accuracy requirements. We evaluate EDEN on multi-core CPUs, GPUs, and DNN accelerators with error models obtained from real approximate DRAM devices. For a target accuracy within 1% of the original DNN, our results show that EDEN enables 1) an average DRAM energy reduction of 21%, 37%, 31%, and 32% in CPU, GPU, and two DNN accelerator architectures, respectively, across a variety of DNNs, and 2) an average (maximum) speedup of 8% (17%) and 2.7% (5.5%) in CPU and GPU architectures, respectively, when evaluating latency-bound DNNs.