Ofer Zeitouni

Inbar Seroussi, Ofer Zeitouni

We study in this paper lower bounds for the generalization error of models derived from multi-layer neural networks, in the regime where the size of the layers is commensurate with the number of samples in the training data. We show that unbiased estimators have unacceptable performance for such nonlinear networks in this regime. We derive explicit generalization lower bounds for general biased estimators, in the cases of linear regression and of two-layered networks. In the linear case the bound is asymptotically tight. In the nonlinear case, we provide a comparison of our bounds with an empirical study of the stochastic gradient descent algorithm. The analysis uses elements from the theory of large random matrices.

Amir Dembo, Sreeram Kannan, Ertem Nusret Tas et al.

Nakamoto invented the longest chain protocol, and claimed its security by analyzing the private double-spend attack, a race between the adversary and the honest nodes to grow a longer chain. But is it the worst attack? We answer the question in the affirmative for three classes of longest chain protocols, designed for different consensus models: 1) Nakamoto's original Proof-of-Work protocol; 2) Ouroboros and SnowWhite Proof-of-Stake protocols; 3) Chia Proof-of-Space protocol. As a consequence, exact characterization of the maximum tolerable adversary power is obtained for each protocol as a function of the average block time normalized by the network delay. The security analysis of these protocols is performed in a unified manner by a novel method of reducing all attacks to a race between the adversary and the honest nodes.

Vivek Bagaria, Amir Dembo, Sreeram Kannan et al.

The Nakamoto longest chain protocol is remarkably simple and has been proven to provide security against any adversary with less than 50% of the total hashing power. Proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols are an energy efficient alternative; however existing protocols adopting Nakamoto's longest chain design achieve provable security only by allowing long-term predictability (which have serious security implications). In this paper, we prove that a natural longest chain PoS protocol with similar predictability as Nakamoto's PoW protocol can achieve security against any adversary with less than 1/(1+e) fraction of the total stake. Moreover we propose a new family of longest chain PoS protocols that achieve security against a 50% adversary, while only requiring short-term predictability. Our proofs present a new approach to analyzing the formal security of blockchains, based on a notion of adversary-proof convergence.