ARMay 29
KernelCraft: Benchmarking for Agentic Close-to-Metal Kernel Generation on Emerging HardwareJiayi Nie, Haoran Wu, Yao Lai et al. · cambridge, tsinghua
New AI accelerators with novel instruction set architectures (ISAs) often require developers to manually craft low-level kernels, a time-consuming and error-prone process that does not scale across hardware targets. This delays emerging hardware platforms from reaching the market. While prior LLM-based code generation has shown promise in mature GPU ecosystems, it remains unclear whether agentic LLM systems can quickly produce valid and efficient kernels for emerging hardware with new ISAs. We present KernelCraft: the first benchmark for evaluating an LLM agent's ability to generate and optimize low-level kernels for customized accelerators through a function-calling, feedback-driven workflow. We evaluate agent performance across three emerging accelerators on more than 20 machine-learning tasks, each with five diverse task configurations. Across four leading reasoning models, the strongest agents generate functionally correct kernels for unseen ISAs within a few refinement steps and produce optimized kernels that match or outperform compiler baselines. These results demonstrate KernelCraft's potential to accelerate the accelerator chip development cycle. KernelCraft is available at https://kernelcraft-cam.github.io/.
ARApr 12Code
Combating the Memory Walls: Optimization Pathways for Long-Context Agentic LLM InferenceHaoran Wu, Can Xiao, Jiayi Nie et al.
LLMs now form the backbone of AI agents across a diverse range of applications, including tool use, command-line interfaces, and web or computer interaction. These agentic LLM inference tasks are fundamentally different from chatbot-focused inference. They often involve much longer context lengths to capture complex and prolonged inputs, such as an entire webpage DOM or complicated tool-call trajectories. This, in turn, generates significant off-chip memory traffic during inference and causes workloads to be constrained by two memory walls, namely the bandwidth wall and the capacity wall, preventing compute units from achieving high utilization. In this paper, we introduce PLENA, a hardware-software co-designed system built around three core optimization pathways. PLENA features a novel flattened systolic-array architecture (Pathway 1) and efficient compute and memory units that support an asymmetric quantization scheme (Pathway 2). It also provides native support for FlashAttention (Pathway 3). In addition, PLENA includes a complete software-hardware stack, consisting of a custom ISA, a compiler, a transaction-level simulator, and an automated design-space exploration flow. Experimental results show that PLENA delivers up to 2.23x and 4.70x higher throughput than the A100 GPU and TPU v6e, respectively, under identical multiplier counts and memory configurations during LLaMA agentic inference. PLENA also achieves up to 4.04x higher energy efficiency than the A100 GPU. The full PLENA system, including its simulator, compiler, ISA, and RTL implementation, will be open-sourced to the research community.
CRNov 19, 2019
MuonTrap: Preventing Cross-Domain Spectre-Like Attacks by Capturing Speculative StateSam Ainsworth, Timothy M. Jones
The disclosure of the Spectre speculative-execution attacks in January 2018 has left a severe vulnerability that systems are still struggling with how to patch. The solutions that currently exist tend to have incomplete coverage, perform badly, or have highly undesirable edge cases that cause application domains to break. MuonTrap allows processors to continue to speculate, avoiding significant reductions in performance, without impacting security. We instead prevent the propagation of any state based on speculative execution, by placing the results of speculative cache accesses into a small, fast L0 filter cache, that is non-inclusive, non-exclusive with the rest of the cache hierarchy. This isolates all parts of the system that can't be quickly cleared on any change in threat domain. MuonTrap uses these speculative filter caches, which are cleared on context and protection-domain switches, along with a series of extensions to the cache coherence protocol and prefetcher. This renders systems immune to cross-domain information leakage via Spectre and a host of similar attacks based on speculative execution, with low performance impact and few changes to the CPU design.