Can Deha Karıksız

Naci Saldi, Can Deha Karıksız, Maxim Raginsky et al.

In this paper, we consider non-signaling approximation of finite stochastic teams. We first introduce a hierarchy of team decision rules that can be classified in an increasing order as randomized policies, quantum-correlated policies, and non-signaling policies. Then, we establish an approximation of team-optimal policies for sequential teams via extendible non-signaling policies. We prove that the distance between extendible non-signaling policies and decentralized policies is small if the extension is sufficiently large. Using this result, we establish a linear programming (LP) approximation of sequential teams. Finally, we state an open problem regarding computation of optimal value of quantum-correlated policies.

Berkay Anahtarcı, Can Deha Karıksız, Naci Saldi

We consider learning approximate Nash equilibria for discrete-time mean-field games with nonlinear stochastic state dynamics subject to both average and discounted costs. To this end, we introduce a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator, whose fixed point is a mean-field equilibrium (i.e. equilibrium in the infinite population limit). We first prove that this operator is a contraction, and propose a learning algorithm to compute an approximate mean-field equilibrium by approximating the MFE operator with a random one. Moreover, using the contraction property of the MFE operator, we establish the error analysis of the proposed learning algorithm. We then show that the learned mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games.