Jan-Philipp Fränken

Kanishk Gandhi, Jan-Philipp Fränken, Tobias Gerstenberg et al.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our everyday lives, understanding their ability to comprehend human mental states becomes critical for ensuring effective interactions. However, despite the recent attempts to assess the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities of LLMs, the degree to which these models can align with human ToM remains a nuanced topic of exploration. This is primarily due to two distinct challenges: (1) the presence of inconsistent results from previous evaluations, and (2) concerns surrounding the validity of existing evaluation methodologies. To address these challenges, we present a novel framework for procedurally generating evaluations with LLMs by populating causal templates. Using our framework, we create a new social reasoning benchmark (BigToM) for LLMs which consists of 25 controls and 5,000 model-written evaluations. We find that human participants rate the quality of our benchmark higher than previous crowd-sourced evaluations and comparable to expert-written evaluations. Using BigToM, we evaluate the social reasoning capabilities of a variety of LLMs and compare model performances with human performance. Our results suggest that GPT4 has ToM capabilities that mirror human inference patterns, though less reliable, while other LLMs struggle.

Jan-Philipp Fränken, Sam Kwok, Peixuan Ye et al. · stanford

We explore the idea of aligning an AI assistant by inverting a model of users' (unknown) preferences from observed interactions. To validate our proposal, we run proof-of-concept simulations in the economic ultimatum game, formalizing user preferences as policies that guide the actions of simulated players. We find that the AI assistant accurately aligns its behavior to match standard policies from the economic literature (e.g., selfish, altruistic). However, the assistant's learned policies lack robustness and exhibit limited generalization in an out-of-distribution setting when confronted with a currency (e.g., grams of medicine) that was not included in the assistant's training distribution. Additionally, we find that when there is inconsistency in the relationship between language use and an unknown policy (e.g., an altruistic policy combined with rude language), the assistant's learning of the policy is slowed. Overall, our preliminary results suggest that developing simulation frameworks in which AI assistants need to infer preferences from diverse users can provide a valuable approach for studying practical alignment questions.

Kanishk Gandhi, Zoe Lynch, Jan-Philipp Fränken et al.

Understanding emotions is fundamental to human interaction and experience. Humans easily infer emotions from situations or facial expressions, situations from emotions, and do a variety of other affective cognition. How adept is modern AI at these inferences? We introduce an evaluation framework for testing affective cognition in foundation models. Starting from psychological theory, we generate 1,280 diverse scenarios exploring relationships between appraisals, emotions, expressions, and outcomes. We evaluate the abilities of foundation models (GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini-1.5-Pro) and humans (N = 567) across carefully selected conditions. Our results show foundation models tend to agree with human intuitions, matching or exceeding interparticipant agreement. In some conditions, models are ``superhuman'' -- they better predict modal human judgements than the average human. All models benefit from chain-of-thought reasoning. This suggests foundation models have acquired a human-like understanding of emotions and their influence on beliefs and behavior.

Violet Xiang, Charlie Snell, Kanishk Gandhi et al. · stanford

We propose a novel framework, Meta Chain-of-Thought (Meta-CoT), which extends traditional Chain-of-Thought (CoT) by explicitly modeling the underlying reasoning required to arrive at a particular CoT. We present empirical evidence from state-of-the-art models exhibiting behaviors consistent with in-context search, and explore methods for producing Meta-CoT via process supervision, synthetic data generation, and search algorithms. Finally, we outline a concrete pipeline for training a model to produce Meta-CoTs, incorporating instruction tuning with linearized search traces and reinforcement learning post-training. Finally, we discuss open research questions, including scaling laws, verifier roles, and the potential for discovering novel reasoning algorithms. This work provides a theoretical and practical roadmap to enable Meta-CoT in LLMs, paving the way for more powerful and human-like reasoning in artificial intelligence.

Chinmaya Andukuri, Jan-Philipp Fränken, Tobias Gerstenberg et al.

When prompting language models to complete a task, users often leave important aspects unsaid. While asking questions could resolve this ambiguity (GATE; Li et al., 2023), models often struggle to ask good questions. We explore a language model's ability to self-improve (STaR; Zelikman et al., 2022) by rewarding the model for generating useful questions-a simple method we dub STaR-GATE. We generate a synthetic dataset of 25,500 unique persona-task prompts to simulate conversations between a pretrained language model-the Questioner-and a Roleplayer whose preferences are unknown to the Questioner. By asking questions, the Questioner elicits preferences from the Roleplayer. The Questioner is iteratively finetuned on questions that increase the probability of high-quality responses to the task, which are generated by an Oracle with access to the Roleplayer's latent preferences. After two iterations of self-improvement, the Questioner asks better questions, allowing it to generate responses that are preferred over responses from the initial model on 72% of tasks. Our results indicate that teaching a language model to ask better questions leads to better personalized responses.

Jan-Philipp Fränken, Eric Zelikman, Rafael Rafailov et al.

When prompting a language model (LM), users often expect the model to adhere to a set of behavioral principles across diverse tasks, such as producing insightful content while avoiding harmful or biased language. Instilling such principles (i.e., a constitution) into a model is resource-intensive, technically challenging, and generally requires human preference labels or examples. We introduce SAMI, an iterative algorithm that finetunes a pretrained language model (without requiring preference labels or demonstrations) to increase the conditional mutual information between constitutions and self-generated responses given queries from a dataset. On single-turn dialogue and summarization, a SAMI-trained mistral-7b outperforms the initial pretrained model, with win rates between 66% and 77%. Strikingly, it also surpasses an instruction-finetuned baseline (mistral-7b-instruct) with win rates between 55% and 57% on single-turn dialogue. SAMI requires a model that writes the principles. To avoid dependence on strong models for writing principles, we align a strong pretrained model (mixtral-8x7b) using constitutions written by a weak instruction-finetuned model (mistral-7b-instruct), achieving a 65% win rate on summarization. Finally, we investigate whether SAMI generalizes to diverse summarization principles (e.g., "summaries should be scientific") and scales to stronger models (llama3-70b), finding that it achieves win rates of up to 68% for learned and 67% for held-out principles compared to the base model. Our results show that a pretrained LM can learn to follow constitutions without using preference labels, demonstrations, or human oversight.

Polina Tsvilodub, Kanishk Gandhi, Haoran Zhao et al.

Humans naturally interpret numbers non-literally, effortlessly combining context, world knowledge, and speaker intent. We investigate whether large language models (LLMs) interpret numbers similarly, focusing on hyperbole and pragmatic halo effects. Through systematic comparison with human data and computational models of pragmatic reasoning, we find that LLMs diverge from human interpretation in striking ways. By decomposing pragmatic reasoning into testable components, grounded in the Rational Speech Act framework, we pinpoint where LLM processing diverges from human cognition -- not in prior knowledge, but in reasoning with it. This insight leads us to develop a targeted solution -- chain-of-thought prompting inspired by an RSA model makes LLMs' interpretations more human-like. Our work demonstrates how computational cognitive models can both diagnose AI-human differences and guide development of more human-like language understanding capabilities.

Jan-Philipp Fränken, Kanishk Gandhi, Tori Qiu et al.

As AI systems like language models are increasingly integrated into decision-making processes affecting people's lives, it's critical to ensure that these systems have sound moral reasoning. To test whether they do, we need to develop systematic evaluations. We provide a framework that uses a language model to translate causal graphs that capture key aspects of moral dilemmas into prompt templates. With this framework, we procedurally generated a large and diverse set of moral dilemmas -- the OffTheRails benchmark -- consisting of 50 scenarios and 400 unique test items. We collected moral permissibility and intention judgments from human participants for a subset of our items and compared these judgments to those from two language models (GPT-4 and Claude-2) across eight conditions. We find that moral dilemmas in which the harm is a necessary means (as compared to a side effect) resulted in lower permissibility and higher intention ratings for both participants and language models. The same pattern was observed for evitable versus inevitable harmful outcomes. However, there was no clear effect of whether the harm resulted from an agent's action versus from having omitted to act. We discuss limitations of our prompt generation pipeline and opportunities for improving scenarios to increase the strength of experimental effects.