Thomas Boudou

Linus Bleistein, Mathieu Dagréou, Francisco Andrade et al.

Ensuring fairness in matching algorithms is a key challenge in allocating scarce resources and positions. Focusing on Optimal Transport (OT), we introduce a novel notion of group fairness requiring that the probability of matching two individuals from any two given groups in the OT plan satisfies a predefined target. We first propose \texttt{FairSinkhorn}, a modified Sinkhorn algorithm to compute perfectly fair transport plans efficiently. Since exact fairness can significantly degrade matching quality in practice, we then develop two relaxation strategies. The first one involves solving a penalised OT problem, for which we derive novel finite-sample complexity guarantees. This result is of independent interest as it can be generalized to arbitrary convex penalties. Our second strategy leverages bilevel optimization to learn a ground cost that induces a fair OT solution, and we establish a bound guaranteeing that the learned cost yields fair matchings on unseen data. Finally, we present empirical results that illustrate the trade-offs between fairness and performance.

Thomas Boudou, Batiste Le Bars, Nirupam Gupta et al.

Robust distributed learning algorithms aim to maintain reliable performance despite the presence of misbehaving workers. Such misbehaviors are commonly modeled as Byzantine failures, allowing arbitrarily corrupted communication, or as data poisoning, a weaker form of corruption restricted to local training data. While prior work shows similar optimization guarantees for both models, an important question remains: How do these threat models impact generalization? Empirical evidence suggests a gap, yet it remains unclear whether it is unavoidable or merely an artifact of suboptimal attacks. We show, for the first time, a fundamental gap in generalization guarantees between the two threat models: Byzantine failures yield strictly worse rates than those achievable under data poisoning. Our findings leverage a tight algorithmic stability analysis of robust distributed learning. Specifically, we prove that: (i) under data poisoning, the uniform algorithmic stability of an algorithm with optimal optimization guarantees degrades by an additive factor of $\varTheta ( \frac{f}{n-f} )$, with $f$ out of $n$ workers misbehaving; whereas $\textit{(ii)}$ under Byzantine failures, the degradation is in $Ω\big( \sqrt{ \frac{f}{n-2f}} \big)$.