CRApr 20, 2020
S3Library: Automatically Eliminating C/C++ Buffer Overflow using Compatible Safer LibrariesKang Sun, Daliang Xu, Dongwei Chen et al.
Annex K of C11, bounds-checking interfaces, recently introduced a set of alternative functions to mitigate buffer overflows, primarily those caused by string/memory functions. However, poor compatibility limits their adoption. Failure oblivious computing can eliminate the possibility that an attacker can exploit memory errors to corrupt the address space and significantly increase the availability of systems. In this paper, we present S3Library (Saturation-Memory-Access Safer String Library), which is compatible with the standard C library in terms of function signature. Our technique automatically replaces unsafe deprecated memory/string functions with safer versions that perform bounds checking and eliminate buffer overflows via boundless memory. S3Library employs MinFat, a very compact pointer representation following the Less is More principle, to encode metadata into unused upper bits within pointers. In addition, S3Library utilizes Saturation Memory Access to eliminate illegal memory accesses into boundless padding area. Even if an out-of-bounds access is made, the fault program will not be interrupted. We implement our scheme within the LLVM framework on X86-64 and evaluate our approach on correctness, security, runtime performance and availability.
CRFeb 29, 2020
DangKiller: Eliminating Dangling Pointers Efficiently via Implicit IdentifierDaliang Xu, Dongwei Chen, Chun Yang et al.
Use-After-Free vulnerabilities, allowing the attacker to access unintended memory via dangling pointers, are more threatening. However, most detection schemes can only detect dangling pointers and invalid them, but not provide a tolerance mechanism to repair the errors at runtime. Also, these techniques obtain and manage the metadata inefficiently with complex structures and too much scan (sweep). The goal of this paper is to use compiler instrumentation to eliminate dangling pointers automatically and efficiently. In this paper, we observe that most techniques lack accurate efficient pointer graph metadata maintaining methods, so they need to scan the log to reduce the redundancy and sweep the whole address space to find dangling pointers. Also, they lack a direct, efficiently obtaining metadata approach. The key insight of this paper is that a unique identifier can be used as a key to a hash or direct-map algorithm. Thus, this paper maintains the same implicit identifier with each memory object and its corresponding referent. Associating the unique ID with metadata for memory objects, obtaining and managing the pointer graph metadata can be efficiently. Therefore, with the delayed free technique adopted into C/C++, we present the DangKiller as a novel and lightweight dangling pointer elimination solution. We first demonstrate the MinFat Pointer, which can calculate unique implicit ID for each object and pointer quickly, and use hash algorithm to obtain metadata. Secondly, we propose the Log Cache and Log Compression mechanism based on the ID to decrease the redundancy of dangling pointer candidates. Coupled with the Address Tagging architecture on an ARM64 system, our experiments show that the DangKiller can eliminate use-after-free vulnerabilities at only 11% and 3% runtime overheads for the SPEC CPU2006 and 2017 benchmarks respectively, except for unique cases.
CRFeb 7, 2020
Saturation Memory Access: Mitigating Memory Spatial Errors without Terminating ProgramsDongwei Chen, Daliang Xu, Dong Tong et al.
Memory spatial errors, i.e., buffer overflow vulnerabilities, have been a well-known issue in computer security for a long time and remain one of the root causes of exploitable vulnerabilities. Most of the existing mitigation tools adopt a fail-stop strategy to protect programs from intrusions, which means the victim program will be terminated upon detecting a memory safety violation. Unfortunately, the fail-stop strategy harms the availability of software. In this paper, we propose Saturation Memory Access (SMA), a memory spatial error mitigation mechanism that prevents out-of-bounds access without terminating a program. SMA is based on a key observation that developers generally do not rely on out-of-bounds accesses to implement program logic. SMA modifies dynamic memory allocators and adds paddings to objects to form an enlarged object boundary. By dynamically correcting all the out-of-bounds accesses to operate on the enlarged protecting boundaries, SMA can tolerate out-of-bounds accesses. For the sake of compatibility, we chose tagged pointers to record the boundary metadata of a memory object in the pointer itself, and correct the address upon detecting out-of-bounds access. We have implemented the prototype of SMA on LLVM 10.0. Our results show that our compiler enables the programs to execute successfully through buffer overflow attacks. Experiments on MiBench show that our prototype incurs an overhead of 78\%. Further optimizations would require ISA supports.