Neha Narula

Daniel Aronoff, F. Christopher Calabia, Anders Brownworth et al.

U.S. dollar stablecoins are increasingly used as payment and settlement instruments beyond cryptocurrency markets. With the enactment of the GENIUS Act in 2025, the United States established the first comprehensive federal framework governing their issuance, backing, and supervision. This paper evaluates the financial, technological, and regulatory risks that may arise as GENIUS-compliant stablecoins scale into mainstream use. We show that maintaining par-value redemption may depend not only on backing-asset quality, but also on the functioning of Treasury and repo markets, the balance-sheet capacity of broker-dealers, and the operational reliability of blockchain-based transaction rails. Even conservatively backed stablecoins can face stress from redemption surges, market-intermediation bottlenecks, or technological disruptions. We argue that durable stability will likely require an integrated approach spanning financial-market infrastructure, prudential regulation, and software governance. While grounded in U.S.\ law, the analysis identifies principles that are relevant for regulators in other jurisdictions developing stablecoin regimes.

Daniel J. Moroz, Daniel J. Aronoff, Neha Narula et al.

Proof-of-Work mining is intended to provide blockchains with robustness against double-spend attacks. However, an economic analysis that follows from Budish (2018), which considers free entry conditions together with the ability to rent sufficient hashrate to conduct an attack, suggests that the resulting block rewards can make an attack cheap. We formalize a defense to double-spend attacks. We show that when the victim can counterattack in the same way as the attacker, this leads to a variation on the classic game-theoretic War of Attrition model. The threat of this kind of counterattack induces a subgame perfect equilibrium in which no attack occurs in the first place.