Timour Ichmoukhamedov

Timour Ichmoukhamedov, James Hinns, David Martens

A rapidly developing application of LLMs in XAI is to convert quantitative explanations such as SHAP into user-friendly narratives to explain the decisions made by smaller prediction models. Evaluating the narratives without relying on human preference studies or surveys is becoming increasingly important in this field. In this work we propose a framework and explore several automated metrics to evaluate LLM-generated narratives for explanations of tabular classification tasks. We apply our approach to compare several state-of-the-art LLMs across different datasets and prompt types. As a demonstration of their utility, these metrics allow us to identify new challenges related to LLM hallucinations for XAI narratives.

Timour Ichmoukhamedov, David Martens

Several recent works argue that LLMs have a universal truth direction where true and false statements are linearly separable in the activation space of the model. It has been demonstrated that linear probes trained on a single hidden state of the model already generalize across a range of topics and might even be used for lie detection in LLM conversations. In this work we explore how this truth direction generalizes between various conversational formats. We find good generalization between short conversations that end on a lie, but poor generalization to longer formats where the lie appears earlier in the input prompt. We propose a solution that significantly improves this type of generalization by adding a fixed key phrase at the end of each conversation. Our results highlight the challenges towards reliable LLM lie detectors that generalize to new settings.

Mateusz Cedro, Timour Ichmoukhamedov, Sofie Goethals et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as near-autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents capable of making everyday decisions on behalf of humans. Although LLMs perform well on many technical tasks, their behaviour in personal decision-making remains less understood. Previous studies have assessed their rationality and moral alignment with human decisions. However, the behaviour of AI assistants in scenarios where financial rewards are at odds with user comfort has not yet been thoroughly explored. In this paper, we tackle this problem by quantifying the prices assigned by multiple LLMs to a series of user discomforts: additional walking, waiting, hunger and pain. We uncover several key concerns that strongly question the prospect of using current LLMs as decision-making assistants: (1) a large variance in responses between LLMs, (2) within a single LLM, responses show fragility to minor variations in prompt phrasing (e.g., reformulating the question in the first person can considerably alter the decision), (3) LLMs can accept unreasonably low rewards for major inconveniences (e.g., 1 Euro to wait 10 hours), and (4) LLMs can reject monetary gains where no discomfort is imposed (e.g., 1,000 Euro to wait 0 minutes). These findings emphasize the need for scrutiny of how LLMs value human inconvenience, particularly as we move toward applications where such cash-versus-comfort trade-offs are made on users' behalf.