ForecastBench: A Dynamic Benchmark of AI Forecasting CapabilitiesEzra Karger, Houtan Bastani, Chen Yueh-Han et al. · berkeley, deepmind
Forecasts of future events are essential inputs into informed decision-making. Machine learning (ML) systems have the potential to deliver forecasts at scale, but there is no framework for evaluating the accuracy of ML systems on a standardized set of forecasting questions. To address this gap, we introduce ForecastBench: a dynamic benchmark that evaluates the accuracy of ML systems on an automatically generated and regularly updated set of 1,000 forecasting questions. To avoid any possibility of data leakage, ForecastBench is comprised solely of questions about future events that have no known answer at the time of submission. We quantify the capabilities of current ML systems by collecting forecasts from expert (human) forecasters, the general public, and LLMs on a random subset of questions from the benchmark ($N=200$). While LLMs have achieved super-human performance on many benchmarks, they perform less well here: expert forecasters outperform the top-performing LLM ($p$-value $<0.001$). We display system and human scores in a public leaderboard at www.forecastbench.org.
10.4AIMay 21
Is Capability a Liability? More Capable Language Models Make Worse Forecasts When It Matters MostNick Merrill, Jaeho Lee, Ezra Karger
We document inverse scaling in LLMs on forecasting problems whose underlying time series exhibit superlinear growth and tail risk of regime change, a structure common in finance and epidemiology. On these tasks, more capable models produce worse distributional forecasts. The pattern appears on ForecastBench-Sim (FBSim), a contamination-free, simulated-world benchmark we release, in forecasting synthetic SIR epidemics with a matched linear control, and replicates in real-world datasets on COVID-19, measles, housing markets, and hyperinflation. A per-quantile decomposition shows the failure concentrates at the upper tail, which more capable models shift upward to track aggressive extrapolations of growth, while the lower tail stays put. A within-family study of Llama-3.1 shows that both model scale and post-training independently contribute to this effect. Domain knowledge does not reliably rescue calibration. This inverse scaling does not appear on single-threshold metrics common in LLM forecasting benchmarks, reversing the sign of the capability--accuracy relationship on identical outputs. Single-threshold scoring at conventional cutoffs misses the upper-tail cost; tail-inclusive scoring reverses the sign of the capability--accuracy relationship on the same outputs. We recommend that LLM forecasting evaluations use continuous (and unbounded) measures of accuracy alongside bounded binary threshold metrics.
16.9CLJun 29
Measuring Judgment Quality in Natural-Language Explanations: Evidence from Forecasting TournamentsChristopher W. Karvetski, Sheldon S. Huang, Simas Kučinskas et al.
Decision-makers routinely rely on expert judgments accompanied by written explanations, yet explanation quality is difficult to measure at scale. Forecasting tournaments offer a natural testing ground: probabilistic judgments are paired with natural-language rationales and scored against realized outcomes. We introduce Explanation Quality Markers (EQMs), a set of sixty theory-guided reasoning patterns scored by large language models (LLMs). In a pre-registered analysis of over 55,000 forecast-rationale pairs from a multiyear forecasting tournament, EQMs predict accuracy at both the forecast and forecaster levels, consistently outperforming pre-LLM text-analysis methods. More than 90% of statistically significant pattern-level EQM-accuracy correlations match our directional hypotheses. The signal is asymmetric: EQMs identify likely underperformers more reliably than they distinguish the very best forecasters. Benchmarked against traditional indicators of forecasting skill, EQMs are the strongest predictor at the forecast level and competitive at the forecaster level, though weaker than prior accuracy. Human ratings of rationale quality are less consistently correlated with accuracy and place disproportionate weight on rationale length. Results transfer to an independent forecasting study. EQMs provide a scalable, interpretable method for extracting judgment-relevant information from written explanations.
14.9CYFeb 12, 2024
AI-Augmented Predictions: LLM Assistants Improve Human Forecasting AccuracyPhilipp Schoenegger, Peter S. Park, Ezra Karger et al.
Large language models (LLMs) match and sometimes exceeding human performance in many domains. This study explores the potential of LLMs to augment human judgement in a forecasting task. We evaluate the effect on human forecasters of two LLM assistants: one designed to provide high-quality ("superforecasting") advice, and the other designed to be overconfident and base-rate neglecting, thus providing noisy forecasting advice. We compare participants using these assistants to a control group that received a less advanced model that did not provide numerical predictions or engaged in explicit discussion of predictions. Participants (N = 991) answered a set of six forecasting questions and had the option to consult their assigned LLM assistant throughout. Our preregistered analyses show that interacting with each of our frontier LLM assistants significantly enhances prediction accuracy by between 24 percent and 28 percent compared to the control group. Exploratory analyses showed a pronounced outlier effect in one forecasting item, without which we find that the superforecasting assistant increased accuracy by 41 percent, compared with 29 percent for the noisy assistant. We further examine whether LLM forecasting augmentation disproportionately benefits less skilled forecasters, degrades the wisdom-of-the-crowd by reducing prediction diversity, or varies in effectiveness with question difficulty. Our data do not consistently support these hypotheses. Our results suggest that access to a frontier LLM assistant, even a noisy one, can be a helpful decision aid in cognitively demanding tasks compared to a less powerful model that does not provide specific forecasting advice. However, the effects of outliers suggest that further research into the robustness of this pattern is needed.
11.5AIJun 17
ForecastBench-Sim: A Simulated-World Forecasting BenchmarkJaeho Lee, Nick Merrill, Ezra Karger
Forecasting benchmarks for general-purpose AI systems usually inherit the constraints of the real world: outcomes resolve slowly, tail events are rare, and counterfactual questions are difficult to score. We introduce ForecastBench-Sim, a simulated-world forecasting benchmark built on game rollouts from Freeciv, a turn-based strategy game modelled on the Civilization series. Forecasters receive a fixed world report (a structured snapshot of the current game state) and answer questions about hidden future states; the benchmark then continues the simulation and scores forecasts. Because the world is simulated, the same setup can generate continuous or binary forecasting questions at arbitrary time horizons, paired intervention worlds for conditional or causal questions, and resolved examples of rare or disruptive outcomes. We describe the benchmark pipeline, question families, scoring protocol, and release artifacts, and report validation slices from model evaluations and an anonymized human pilot. ForecastBench-Sim is intended to complement real-world forecasting benchmarks by providing controlled, immediately resolvable tasks for studying probabilistic reasoning under dynamic world states.
21.3CLMay 14, 2025
Large Language Models Are More Persuasive Than Incentivized Human PersuadersPhilipp Schoenegger, Francesco Salvi, Jiacheng Liu et al. · oxford
We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.
2.3GTFeb 19, 2025
Tell Me Why: Incentivizing ExplanationsSiddarth Srinivasan, Ezra Karger, Michiel Bakker et al.
Common sense suggests that when individuals explain why they believe something, we can arrive at more accurate conclusions than when they simply state what they believe. Yet, there is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit explanations for beliefs from agents. This likely stems from the fact that standard Bayesian models make assumptions (like conditional independence of signals) that preempt the need for explanations, in order to show efficient information aggregation. A natural justification for the value of explanations is that agents' beliefs tend to be drawn from overlapping sources of information, so agents' belief reports do not reveal all that needs to be known. Indeed, this work argues that rationales-explanations of an agent's private information-lead to more efficient aggregation by allowing agents to efficiently identify what information they share and what information is new. Building on this model of rationales, we present a novel 'deliberation mechanism' to elicit rationales from agents in which truthful reporting of beliefs and rationales is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.