Xingjian Ding

Bin Ma, Xingjian Ding, Tekin Bicer et al.

Diffusion Transformers (DiTs) are increasingly adopted in scientific computing, yet growing model sizes and resolutions make distributed multi-GPU inference essential. Ulysses sequence parallelism scales DiT inference but introduces frequent all-to-all collectives that dominate latency. Overlapping these with computation is difficult due to tight data dependencies, large message volumes, and asymmetric interconnect bandwidths. We introduce CoCoDiff, a distributed DiT inference engine exploiting two observations: (1) V requires only linear projection while Q/K need additional normalization and RoPE, creating opportunities to overlap V's communication with Q/K computation; (2) adjacent denoising steps produce similar tensors, yielding temporal redundancy. CoCoDiff introduces three mechanisms: Tile-Aware Parallel All-to-all (TAPA) decomposes collectives into topology-aligned phases; V-First scheduling hides V's communication behind Q/K computation; and V-Major selective communication transmits only active projections on slow interconnects. On the Aurora supercomputer with four DiT models across 1-8 nodes (up to 96 Intel GPU tiles), CoCoDiff achieves an average speedup of 3.6x, peaking at 8.4x.

Xingjian Ding, Jianxiong Guo, Deying Li et al.

Attracted by the inherent security and privacy protection of the blockchain, incorporating blockchain into Internet of Things (IoT) has been widely studied in these years. However, the mining process requires high computational power, which prevents IoT devices from directly participating in blockchain construction. For this reason, edge computing service is introduced to help build the IoT blockchain, where IoT devices could purchase computational resources from the edge servers. In this paper, we consider the case that IoT devices also have other tasks that need the help of edge servers, such as data analysis and data storage. The profits they can get from these tasks is closely related to the amounts of resources they purchased from the edge servers. In this scenario, IoT devices will allocate their limited budgets to purchase different resources from different edge servers, such that their profits can be maximized. Moreover, edge servers will set "best" prices such that they can get the biggest benefits. Accordingly, there raise a pricing and budget allocation problem between edge servers and IoT devices. We model the interaction between edge servers and IoT devices as a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game, whose objective is to reach the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SE point, and design efficient algorithms to reach the SE point. In the end, we verify our model and algorithms by performing extensive simulations, and the results show the correctness and effectiveness of our designs.

Xingjian Ding, Jianxiong Guo, Deying Li et al.

The world-changing blockchain technique provides a novel method to establish a secure, trusted and decentralized system for solving the security and personal privacy problems in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications. The mining process in blockchain requires miners to solve a proof-of-work puzzle, which requires high computational power. However, the lightweight IIoT devices cannot directly participate in the mining process due to the limitation of power and computational resources. The edge computing service makes it possible for IIoT applications to build a blockchain network, in which IIoT devices purchase computational resources from edge servers and thus can offload their computational tasks. The amount of computational resource purchased by IIoT devices depends on how many profits they can get in the mining process, and will directly affect the security of the blockchain network. In this paper, we investigate the incentive mechanism for the blockchain platform to attract IIoT devices to purchase more computational power from edge servers to participate in the mining process, thereby building a more secure blockchain network. We model the interaction between the blockchain platform and IIoT devices as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the blockchain platform act as the leader, and IIoT devices act as followers. We analyze the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium point. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm through extensive simulations, and analyze the strategies of blockchain platform and IIoT devices under different situations.