Sarah Bordage

2papers

2 Papers

ITNov 9, 2020
Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity to Algebraic Geometry Codes

Sarah Bordage, Mathieu Lhotel, Jade Nardi et al.

In this work, we initiate the study of proximity testing to Algebraic Geometry (AG) codes. An AG code $C = C(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{P}, D)$ over an algebraic curve $\mathcal{X}$ is a vector space associated to evaluations on $\mathcal{P}$ of functions in the Riemann-Roch space $L_\mathcal{X}(D)$. The problem of testing proximity to an error-correcting code $C$ consists in distinguishing between the case where an input word, given as an oracle, belongs to $C$ and the one where it is far from every codeword of $C$. AG codes are good candidates to construct short proof systems, but there exists no efficient proximity tests for them. We aim to fill this gap. We construct an Interactive Oracle Proof of Proximity (IOPP) for some families of AG codes by generalizing an IOPP for Reed-Solomon codes introduced by Ben-Sasson, Bentov, Horesh and Riabzev, known as the FRI protocol. We identify suitable requirements for designing efficient IOPP systems for AG codes. Our approach relies on a neat decomposition of the Riemann-Roch space of any invariant divisor under a group action on a curve into several explicit Riemann-Roch spaces on the quotient curve. We provide sufficient conditions on an AG code $C$ that allow to reduce a proximity testing problem for $C$ to a membership problem for a significantly smaller code $C'$. As concrete instantiations, we study AG codes on Kummer curves and curves in the Hermitian tower. The latter can be defined over polylogarithmic-size alphabet. We specialize the generic AG-IOPP construction to reach linear prover running time and logarithmic verification on Kummer curves, and quasilinear prover time with polylogarithmic verification on the Hermitian tower.

CRApr 1, 2020
On the privacy of a code-based single-server computational PIR scheme

Sarah Bordage, Julien Lavauzelle

We show that the single-server computational PIR protocol proposed by Holzbaur, Hollanti and Wachter-Zeh in 2020 is not private, in the sense that the server can recover in polynomial time the index of the desired file with very high probability. The attack relies on the following observation. Removing rows of the query matrix corresponding to the desired file yields a large decrease of the dimension over $\mathbb{F}_q$ of the vector space spanned by the rows of this punctured matrix. Such a dimension loss only shows up with negligible probability when rows unrelated to the requested file are deleted.