Yao Cheng, Cheng-Kang Chu, Hsiao-Ying Lin et al.
The recent popularity of machine learning calls for a deeper understanding of AI security. Amongst the numerous AI threats published so far, poisoning attacks currently attract considerable attention. In a poisoning attack the opponent partially tampers the dataset used for learning to mislead the classifier during the testing phase. This paper proposes a new protection strategy against poisoning attacks. The technique relies on a new primitive called keyed non-parametric hypothesis tests allowing to evaluate under adversarial conditions the training input's conformance with a previously learned distribution $\mathfrak{D}$. To do so we use a secret key $κ$ unknown to the opponent. Keyed non-parametric hypothesis tests differs from classical tests in that the secrecy of $κ$ prevents the opponent from misleading the keyed test into concluding that a (significantly) tampered dataset belongs to $\mathfrak{D}$.