Thomas Espitau

2papers

2 Papers

DSMay 28, 2019
Certified lattice reduction

Thomas Espitau, Antoine Joux

Quadratic form reduction and lattice reduction are fundamental tools in computational number theory and in computer science, especially in cryptography. The celebrated Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász reduction algorithm (so-called LLL) has been improved in many ways through the past decades and remains one of the central methods used for reducing integral lattice basis. In particular, its floating-point variants-where the rational arithmetic required by Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization is replaced by floating-point arithmetic-are now the fastest known. However, the systematic study of the reduction theory of real quadratic forms or, more generally, of real lattices is not widely represented in the literature. When the problem arises, the lattice is usually replaced by an integral approximation of (a multiple of) the original lattice, which is then reduced. While practically useful and proven in some special cases, this method doesn't offer any guarantee of success in general. In this work, we present an adaptive-precision version of a generalized LLL algorithm that covers this case in all generality. In particular, we replace floating-point arithmetic by Interval Arithmetic to certify the behavior of the algorithm. We conclude by giving a typical application of the result in algebraic number theory for the reduction of ideal lattices in number fields.

DSJun 10, 2020
The nearest-colattice algorithm

Thomas Espitau, Paul Kirchner

In this work, we exhibit a hierarchy of polynomial time algorithms solving approximate variants of the Closest Vector Problem (CVP). Our first contribution is a heuristic algorithm achieving the same distance tradeoff as HSVP algorithms, namely $\approx β^{\frac{n}{2β}}\textrm{covol}(Λ)^{\frac{1}{n}}$ for a random lattice $Λ$ of rank $n$. Compared to the so-called Kannan's embedding technique, our algorithm allows using precomputations and can be used for efficient batch CVP instances. This implies that some attacks on lattice-based signatures lead to very cheap forgeries, after a precomputation. Our second contribution is a proven reduction from approximating the closest vector with a factor $\approx n^{\frac32}β^{\frac{3n}{2β}}$ to the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in dimension $β$.