Akaki Mamageishvili

Burak Öz, Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili

We study Arbitrum's Timeboost mechanism following the adoption of Kairos by its main users -- Wintermute and Selini Capital -- to understand how the emergence of a just-in-time secondary market affects the dynamics of an ahead-of-time primary auction. We find that competition in the primary auction significantly declines and surplus shifts away from Arbitrum. After the transition, bids paid in the primary auction correspond to only 14.8\% of the highest bid (compared to nearly 62.7\% in the \textit{Pre-Kairos} era), and a lower share of searcher profit-and-loss (PnL), despite total PnL (gross of auction payments) remains of similar magnitude across regimes. This indicates that the primary auction effectively ceases to function as a meaningful surplus extraction mechanism. Although demand for time-boosting valuable CEX--DEX arbitrage transactions continues to increase with external price volatility, observed bids in the Timeboost auction no longer reflect this demand. While the exact distribution of the additional value between searchers and Kairos remains unclear, the evidence suggests that the secondary market captures a substantial share at the expense of the primary auctioneer. We conclude by outlining possible ways for Arbitrum to recapture this value, including modifying the auction design to reduce the gap between value and payments and adopting a dynamic reserve price.

Akaki Mamageishvili, Benny Sudakov

We compare the total capital efficiency of secure restaking and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols. First, we consider the sufficient condition for the restaking graph to be secure. The condition implies that it is always possible to transform such a restaking graph into separate secure PoS protocols. Next, we derive two main results: upper and lower bounds on the required extra stakes to add to the validators of the secure restaking graph to be able to transform it into secure PoS protocols. In particular, we show that the restaking savings compared to PoS protocols can be very large and can asymptotically grow as a square root of the number of validators. We also study a complementary question of aggregating secure PoS protocols into a secure restaking graph and provide matching lower and upper bounds on the PoS savings.

Simon Janin, Kaihua Qin, Akaki Mamageishvili et al.

Digital contents are typically sold online through centralized and custodian marketplaces, which requires the trading partners to trust a central entity. We present FileBounty, a fair protocol which, assuming the cryptographic hash of the file of interest is known to the buyer, is trust-free and lets a buyer purchase data for a previously agreed monetary amount, while guaranteeing the integrity of the contents. To prevent misbehavior, FileBounty guarantees that any deviation from the expected participants' behavior results in a negative financial payoff; i.e. we show that honest behavior corresponds to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Our novel deposit refunding scheme is resistant to extortion attacks under rational adversaries. If buyer and seller behave honestly, FileBounty's execution requires only three on-chain transactions, while the actual data is exchanged off-chain in an efficient and privacy-preserving manner. We moreover show how FileBounty enables a flexible peer-to-peer setting where multiple parties fairly sell a file to a buyer.