Shijie Jiang

Feini Huang, Shijie Jiang, Lu Li et al.

In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) rapidly accelerated its influence and is expected to promote the development of Earth system science (ESS) if properly harnessed. In application of AI to ESS, a significant hurdle lies in the interpretability conundrum, an inherent problem of black-box nature arising from the complexity of AI algorithms. To address this, explainable AI (XAI) offers a set of powerful tools that make the models more transparent. The purpose of this review is twofold: First, to provide ESS scholars, especially newcomers, with a foundational understanding of XAI, serving as a primer to inspire future research advances; second, to encourage ESS professionals to embrace the benefits of AI, free from preconceived biases due to its lack of interpretability. We begin with elucidating the concept of XAI, along with typical methods. We then delve into a review of XAI applications in the ESS literature, highlighting the important role that XAI has played in facilitating communication with AI model decisions, improving model diagnosis, and uncovering scientific insights. We identify four significant challenges that XAI faces within the ESS, and propose solutions. Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive illustration of multifaceted perspectives. Given the unique challenges in ESS, an interpretable hybrid approach that seamlessly integrates AI with domain-specific knowledge appears to be a promising way to enhance the utility of AI in ESS. A visionary outlook for ESS envisions a harmonious blend where process-based models govern the known, AI models explore the unknown, and XAI bridges the gap by providing explanations.

Zhi Zhang, Decheng Chen, Jiahao Qi et al.

Rowhammer has drawn much attention from both academia and industry in the past years as rowhammer exploitation poses severe consequences to system security. Since the first comprehensive study of rowhammer in 2014, a number of rowhammer attacks have been demonstrated against dynamic random access memory (DRAM)-based commodity systems to break software confidentiality, integrity and availability. Accordingly, numerous software defenses have been proposed to mitigate rowhammer attacks on commodity systems of either legacy (e.g., DDR3) or recent DRAM (e.g., DDR4). Besides, multiple hardware defenses (e.g., Target Row Refresh) from the industry have been deployed into recent DRAM to eliminate rowhammer, which we categorize as production defenses. In this paper, we systematize rowhammer attacks and defenses with a focus on DRAM-based commodity systems. Particularly, we have established a unified framework demonstrating how a rowhammer attack affects a commodity system. With the framework, we characterize existing attacks, shedding light on new attack vectors that have not yet been explored. We further leverage the framework to categorize software and production defenses, generalize their key defense strategies and summarize their key limitations, from which potential defense strategies are identified.