Laurent Chuat

Laurent Chuat, Cyrill Krähenbühl, Prateek Mittal et al.

We present F-PKI, an enhancement to the HTTPS public-key infrastructure (or web PKI) that gives trust flexibility to both clients and domain owners, and enables certification authorities (CAs) to enforce stronger security measures. In today's web PKI, all CAs are equally trusted, and security is defined by the weakest link. We address this problem by introducing trust flexibility in two dimensions: with F-PKI, each domain owner can define a domain policy (specifying, for example, which CAs are authorized to issue certificates for their domain name) and each client can set or choose a validation policy based on trust levels. F-PKI thus supports a property that is sorely needed in today's Internet: trust heterogeneity. Different parties can express different trust preferences while still being able to verify all certificates. In contrast, today's web PKI only allows clients to fully distrust suspicious/misbehaving CAs, which is likely to cause collateral damage in the form of legitimate certificates being rejected. Our contribution is to present a system that is backward compatible, provides sensible security properties to both clients and domain owners, ensures the verifiability of all certificates, and prevents downgrade attacks. Furthermore, F-PKI provides a ground for innovation, as it gives CAs an incentive to deploy new security measures to attract more customers, without having these measures undercut by vulnerable CAs.

Joel Wanner, Laurent Chuat, Adrian Perrig

Byzantine fault tolerant protocols enable state replication in the presence of crashed, malfunctioning, or actively malicious processes. Designing such protocols without the assistance of verification tools, however, is remarkably error-prone. In an adversarial environment, performance and flexibility come at the cost of complexity, making the verification of existing protocols extremely difficult. We take a different approach and propose a formally verified consensus protocol designed for a specific use case: secure logging. Our protocol allows each node to propose entries in a parallel subroutine, and guarantees that correct nodes agree on the set of all proposed entries, without leader election. It is simple yet practical, as it can accommodate the workload of a logging system such as Certificate Transparency. We show that it is optimal in terms of both required rounds and tolerable faults. Using Isabelle/HOL, we provide a fully machine-checked security proof based upon the Heard-Of model, which we extend to support signatures. We also present and evaluate a prototype implementation.

Laurent Chuat, AbdelRahman Abdou, Ralf Sasse et al.

The ability to quickly revoke a compromised key is critical to the security of any public-key infrastructure. Regrettably, most traditional certificate revocation schemes suffer from latency, availability, or privacy problems. These problems are exacerbated by the lack of a native delegation mechanism in TLS, which increasingly leads domain owners to engage in dangerous practices such as sharing their private keys with third parties. We analyze solutions that address the long-standing delegation and revocation shortcomings of the web PKI, with a focus on approaches that directly affect the chain of trust (i.e., the X.509 certification path). For this purpose, we propose a 19-criteria framework for characterizing revocation and delegation schemes. We also show that combining short-lived delegated credentials or proxy certificates with an appropriate revocation system would solve several pressing problems.

Lukasz Dykcik, Laurent Chuat, Pawel Szalachowski et al.

This paper describes BlockPKI, a blockchain-based public-key infrastructure that enables an automated, resilient, and transparent issuance of digital certificates. Our goal is to address several shortcomings of the current TLS infrastructure and its proposed extensions. In particular, we aim at reducing the power of individual certification authorities and make their actions publicly visible and accountable, without introducing yet another trusted third party. To demonstrate the benefits and practicality of our system, we present evaluation results and describe our prototype implementation.

Pawel Szalachowski, Laurent Chuat, Taeho Lee et al.

Although TLS is used on a daily basis by many critical applications, the public-key infrastructure that it relies on still lacks an adequate revocation mechanism. An ideal revocation mechanism should be inexpensive, efficient, secure, and privacy-preserving. Moreover, rising trends in pervasive encryption pose new scalability challenges that a modern revocation system should address. In this paper, we investigate how network nodes can deliver certificate-validity information to clients. We present RITM, a framework in which middleboxes (as opposed to clients, servers, or certification authorities) store revocation-related data. RITM provides a secure revocation-checking mechanism that preserves user privacy. We also propose to take advantage of content-delivery networks (CDNs) and argue that they would constitute a fast and cost-effective way to disseminate revocations. Additionally, RITM keeps certification authorities accountable for the revocations that they have issued, and it minimizes overhead at clients and servers, as they have to neither store nor download any messages. We also describe feasible deployment models and present an evaluation of RITM to demonstrate its feasibility and benefits in a real-world deployment.

Laurent Chuat, Pawel Szalachowski, Adrian Perrig et al.

The level of trust accorded to certification authorities has been decreasing over the last few years as several cases of misbehavior and compromise have been observed. Log-based approaches, such as Certificate Transparency, ensure that fraudulent TLS certificates become publicly visible. However, a key element that log-based approaches still lack is a way for clients to verify that the log behaves in a consistent and honest manner. This task is challenging due to privacy, efficiency, and deployability reasons. In this paper, we propose the first (to the best of our knowledge) gossip protocols that enable the detection of log inconsistencies. We analyze these protocols and present the results of a simulation based on real Internet traffic traces. We also give a deployment plan, discuss technical issues, and present an implementation.