Trent Victor

Leif Johnson, Trent Victor, Johan Engström

We present the Field of Safe Motion (FSM), a quantitative safety model for determining whether a driver maintains a collision-free escape route, or "out," at any given moment by accounting for that driver's physical capabilities and the foreseeable actions of other road users. The Field of Safe Travel (FST) provides a framework for representing the types of sensory information and actions available to drivers. However, the FST has remained conceptual in nature since its initial publication almost 90 years ago -- and a concrete computational operationalization is still lacking. At the same time, reachability analysis provides a quantitative basis for assessing the possible actions available to road users, using interpretable kinematic models, but reachability models have so far remained confined largely to the engineering and robotics literature. Bringing these two approaches together provides for an interpretable, quantitative tool for assessing driving behavior across a wide range of driving scenarios. Beyond being interpretable, our approach relies on a relatively small set of basic assumptions that are easy to enumerate and reason about. Furthermore, an interpretable reachability model paired with kinematic assumptions provides a way to bound uncertainty about road users' reasonably foreseeable future locations. We demonstrate the applicability of the FSM to different driving scenarios and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the model.

Nick Webb, Dan Smith, Christopher Ludwick et al.

Waymo's safety methodologies, which draw on well established engineering processes and address new safety challenges specific to Automated Vehicle technology, provide a firm foundation for safe deployment of Waymo's Level 4 ADS, which Waymo also refers to as the Waymo Driver. Waymo's determination of its readiness to deploy its AVs safely in different settings rests on that firm foundation and on a thorough analysis of risks specific to a particular Operational Design Domain. Waymo's process for making these readiness determinations entails an ordered examination of the relevant outputs from all of its safety methodologies combined with careful safety and engineering judgment focused on the specific facts relevant for a particular determination. Waymo will approve when it determines the ADS is ready for the new conditions without creating any unreasonable risks to safety. This paper explains Waymo's methodologies as applied to the three layers of its technology: hardware, ADS behavior, and operations, and also explains Waymo's safety governance. Waymo will continue to apply and adapt those methodologies, and to learn from the important contributions of others in the AV industry, as Waymo continues to build an ever safer and more able ADS.

Matthew Schwall, Tom Daniel, Trent Victor et al.

Waymo's mission to reduce traffic injuries and fatalities and improve mobility for all has led us to expand deployment of automated vehicles on public roads without a human driver behind the wheel. As part of this process, Waymo is committed to providing the public with informative and relevant data regarding the demonstrated safety of Waymo's automated driving system, which we call the Waymo Driver. The data presented in this paper represents more than 6.1 million miles of automated driving in the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area, including operations with a trained operator behind the steering wheel from calendar year 2019 and 65,000 miles of driverless operation without a human behind the steering wheel from 2019 and the first nine months of 2020. The paper includes every collision and minor contact experienced during these operations as well as every predicted contact identified using Waymo's counterfactual, what if, simulation of events had the vehicle's trained operator not disengaged automated driving. There were 47 contact events that occurred over this time period, consisting of 18 actual and 29 simulated contact events, none of which would be expected to result in severe or life threatening injuries. This paper presents the collision typology and severity for each actual and simulated event, along with diagrams depicting each of the most significant events. Nearly all the events involved one or more road rule violations or other errors by a human driver or road user, including all eight of the most severe events, which we define as involving actual or expected airbag deployment in any involved vehicle. When compared to national collision statistics, the Waymo Driver completely avoided certain collision modes that human driven vehicles are frequently involved in, including road departure and collisions with fixed objects.

Lex Fridman, Joonbum Lee, Bryan Reimer et al.

Accurate, robust, inexpensive gaze tracking in the car can help keep a driver safe by facilitating the more effective study of how to improve (1) vehicle interfaces and (2) the design of future Advanced Driver Assistance Systems. In this paper, we estimate head pose and eye pose from monocular video using methods developed extensively in prior work and ask two new interesting questions. First, how much better can we classify driver gaze using head and eye pose versus just using head pose? Second, are there individual-specific gaze strategies that strongly correlate with how much gaze classification improves with the addition of eye pose information? We answer these questions by evaluating data drawn from an on-road study of 40 drivers. The main insight of the paper is conveyed through the analogy of an "owl" and "lizard" which describes the degree to which the eyes and the head move when shifting gaze. When the head moves a lot ("owl"), not much classification improvement is attained by estimating eye pose on top of head pose. On the other hand, when the head stays still and only the eyes move ("lizard"), classification accuracy increases significantly from adding in eye pose. We characterize how that accuracy varies between people, gaze strategies, and gaze regions.