Shizhao Yu

Shiyue Cao, Pei Xu, Likun Yang et al.

We study the problem of deceptive path planning (DPP), where an agent aims to conceal its true destination from external observers. While existing work assumes static, non-learning observers, real-world adversaries-such as in critical goods transportation or military operations-can adapt by learning from historical trajectories. To address this gap, we introduce Repeated Deceptive Path Planning (RDPP), a new formulation that explicitly models learnable observers. We show that existing DPP methods fail under this setting, as they cannot adapt to evolving adversarial predictions. While incorporating observer previous predictions into updates enables some adaptation, such incremental updates cause accumulative lag that degrades deception. To this end, we propose Deceptive Meta Planning (DeMP), a two-level optimization framework that combines episode-level adaptation, which enables short-term policy adjustment to counter updated observer, and meta-level updates, which leverage cross-episode feedback to capture how observers update their models and accelerate adaptation in future episodes. In this way, DeMP mitigates the accumulation of adaptation lag, enabling sustained deception against a learning observer. Experiments across environments demonstrate that DeMP significantly outperforms existing approaches in RDPP while maintaining competitive path cost. Our results highlight the importance of modeling repeated interactions with learnable adversaries, providing new insights into deception and privacy in multi-agent systems.

Qiyue Yin, Pei Xu, Qiaozhe Li et al.

Recent breakthroughs in Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to a qualitative leap in artificial intelligence' s performance on reasoning tasks, particularly demonstrating remarkable capabilities in mathematical, symbolic, and commonsense reasoning. However, as a critical component of advanced human cognition, strategic reasoning, i.e., the ability to assess multi-agent behaviors in dynamic environments, formulate action plans, and adapt strategies, has yet to be systematically evaluated or modeled. To address this gap, this paper introduces WGSR-Bench, the first strategy reasoning benchmark for LLMs using wargame as its evaluation environment. Wargame, a quintessential high-complexity strategic scenario, integrates environmental uncertainty, adversarial dynamics, and non-unique strategic choices, making it an effective testbed for assessing LLMs' capabilities in multi-agent decision-making, intent inference, and counterfactual reasoning. WGSR-Bench designs test samples around three core tasks, i.e., Environmental situation awareness, Opponent risk modeling and Policy generation, which serve as the core S-POE architecture, to systematically assess main abilities of strategic reasoning. Finally, an LLM-based wargame agent is designed to integrate these parts for a comprehensive strategy reasoning assessment. With WGSR-Bench, we hope to assess the strengths and limitations of state-of-the-art LLMs in game-theoretic strategic reasoning and to advance research in large model-driven strategic intelligence.