Soubhik Deb

2papers

2 Papers

44.5CRJun 2
BigDipper: Sharded Censorship Resistant Data Availability for Leader-Based BFT

Bowen Xue, Samuel Laferriere, Soubhik Deb et al.

Leader-based Byzantine-fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols provide low latency and simple communication structure, but they give the leader short-term control over transaction inclusion. A malicious leader can keep the protocol live while delaying or excluding time-sensitive transactions such as auction bids, oracle updates, liquidations, and bridge messages. Existing responses often build a fixed censorship-resistance, hiding, or ordering mechanism into the protocol path, forcing all transactions to pay for the same protection level. name follows the end-to-end principle: the consensus layer exposes inclusion primitives rather than hardcoding stronger policies. Higher-layer protocols can then choose their own submission strategies and resources, whether through replication, erasure coding, or other mechanisms, to obtain the censorship-resistance, hiding, ordering, or execution guarantees they need. At the core of BigDipper is censorship-resistant data availability, or DA-CR, which certifies available replica-contributed mini-blocks for use by leader-based consensus. A central design goal is that data remains sharded on the consensus critical path: validators do not reconstruct or execute the full payload before voting, but instead check commitments, availability evidence, and the DA-CR inclusion rule. We define DA-CR guarantees for data-tampering resistance, honest mini-block inclusion, and residual leader influence. We then give concrete constructions based on erasure coding and linear commitments, analyze client-tunable transaction submission, and instantiate BigDipper inside HotStuff-2.

CROct 15, 2020
PoSAT: Proof-of-Work Availability and Unpredictability, without the Work

Soubhik Deb, Sreeram Kannan, David Tse

An important feature of Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains is full dynamic availability, allowing miners to go online and offline while requiring only 50% of the online miners to be honest. Existing Proof-of-stake (PoS), Proof-of-Space and related protocols are able to achieve this property only partially, either putting the additional assumption that adversary nodes to be online from the beginning and no new adversary nodes come online afterwards, or use additional trust assumptions for newly joining nodes.We propose a new PoS protocol PoSAT which can provably achieve dynamic availability fully without any additional assumptions. The protocol is based on the longest chain and uses a Verifiable Delay Function for the block proposal lottery to provide an arrow of time. The security analysis of the protocol draws on the recently proposed technique of Nakamoto blocks as well as the theory of branching random walks. An additional feature of PoSAT is the complete unpredictability of who will get to propose a block next, even by the winner itself. This unpredictability is at the same level of PoW protocols, and is stronger than that of existing PoS protocols using Verifiable Random Functions.