Faidra Monachou

Nikhil Garg, Hannah Li, Faidra Monachou

We study the role of information and access in capacity-constrained selection problems with fairness concerns. We develop a statistical discrimination framework, where each applicant has multiple features and is potentially strategic. The model formalizes the trade-off between the (potentially positive) informational role of a feature and its (negative) exclusionary nature when members of different social groups have unequal access to this feature. Our framework finds a natural application to policy debates on dropping standardized testing in admissions. Our primary takeaway is that the decision to drop a feature (such as test scores) cannot be made without the joint context of the information provided by other features and how the requirement affects the applicant pool composition. Dropping a feature may exacerbate disparities by decreasing the amount of information available for each applicant, especially those from non-traditional backgrounds. However, in the presence of access barriers to a feature, the interaction between the informational environment and the effect of access barriers on the applicant pool size becomes highly complex. Furthermore, we consider an extension with two schools and costly tests, where strategic students decide whether to take the test or not. Our theoretical results reveal that the students' test-taking behavior can be non-monotonic. We characterize the two-school policy equilibria and show that each school's optimal decision to drop the test critically depends on the other school's test policy. Finally, using calibrated simulations, we demonstrate the presence of practical instances where the decision to eliminate standardized testing improves or worsens all metrics.

Jessie Finocchiaro, Roland Maio, Faidra Monachou et al.

Decision-making systems increasingly orchestrate our world: how to intervene on the algorithmic components to build fair and equitable systems is therefore a question of utmost importance; one that is substantially complicated by the context-dependent nature of fairness and discrimination. Modern decision-making systems that involve allocating resources or information to people (e.g., school choice, advertising) incorporate machine-learned predictions in their pipelines, raising concerns about potential strategic behavior or constrained allocation, concerns usually tackled in the context of mechanism design. Although both machine learning and mechanism design have developed frameworks for addressing issues of fairness and equity, in some complex decision-making systems, neither framework is individually sufficient. In this paper, we develop the position that building fair decision-making systems requires overcoming these limitations which, we argue, are inherent to each field. Our ultimate objective is to build an encompassing framework that cohesively bridges the individual frameworks of mechanism design and machine learning. We begin to lay the ground work towards this goal by comparing the perspective each discipline takes on fair decision-making, teasing out the lessons each field has taught and can teach the other, and highlighting application domains that require a strong collaboration between these disciplines.