Andrew Law

Marian-Andrei Rizoiu, Duy Khuu, Andrew Law et al.

Political polarisation on structured discussion platforms such as Reddit differs fundamentally from that on broadcast platforms such as Twitter/X, yet most prior work targets the latter. We present an end-to-end framework for measuring and analysing polarisation dynamics, applied to the r/Brexit subreddit (871K submissions, November 2015 -- February 2021). We construct r/Brexit, a crowd-annotated stance dataset of 5,895 labelled submissions (inter-annotator agreement = 0.804), and train a domain-adapted BERT classifier. We introduce a continuous polarity metric that replaces discrete stance categories, revealing fine-grained opinion spectra across 27 politically-defined periods. Our analysis yields three key findings: (a) future stance prediction is confounded by survivorship bias: persuadable users disengage, and those who remain are already entrenched; (b) echo chambers are quantifiably dominant, with nearly 40% of interactions between like-minded users; (c) user current polarity is the dominant predictor of future polarity, with echo-chamber immersion as the secondary predictive signal. These findings reveal that Reddit's partisan core is entrenched by self-selection, not softened by cross-cutting exposure.

Andrew Law, Chester Leung, Rishabh Poddar et al.

In recent years, gradient boosted decision tree learning has proven to be an effective method of training robust models. Moreover, collaborative learning among multiple parties has the potential to greatly benefit all parties involved, but organizations have also encountered obstacles in sharing sensitive data due to business, regulatory, and liability concerns. We propose Secure XGBoost, a privacy-preserving system that enables multiparty training and inference of XGBoost models. Secure XGBoost protects the privacy of each party's data as well as the integrity of the computation with the help of hardware enclaves. Crucially, Secure XGBoost augments the security of the enclaves using novel data-oblivious algorithms that prevent access side-channel attacks on enclaves induced via access pattern leakage.