Harold Ollivier

Amit Saha, Harold Ollivier

Interactive verification protocols for quantum computations allow to build trust between a client and a service provider, ensuring the former that the instructed computation was carried out faithfully. They come in two variants, one without quantum communication that requires large overhead on the server side to coherently implement quantum-resistant cryptographic primitives, and one with quantum communication but with repetition as the only overhead on the service provider's side. Given the limited number of available qubits on current machines, only quantum communication-based protocols have yielded proof of concepts. In this work, we show that the repetition overhead of protocols with quantum communication can be further mitigated if one examines the task of operating a quantum machine from the service provider's point of view. Indeed, we show that the test rounds data, whose collection is necessary to provide security, can indeed be recycled to perform continuous monitoring of noise model parameters for the service provider. This exemplifies the versatility of these protocols, whose template can serve multiple purposes and increases the interest in considering their early integration into development roadmaps of quantum machines.

Elham Kashefi, Dominik Leichtle, Luka Music et al.

Recent experimental achievements motivate an ever-growing interest from companies starting to feel the limitations of classical computing. Yet, in light of ongoing privacy scandals, the future availability of quantum computing through remotely accessible servers pose peculiar challenges: Clients with quantum-limited capabilities want their data and algorithms to remain hidden, while being able to verify that their computations are performed correctly. Research in blind and verifiable delegation of quantum computing attempts to address this question. However, available techniques suffer not only from high overheads but also from over-sensitivity: When running on noisy devices, imperfections trigger the same detection mechanisms as malicious attacks, resulting in perpetually aborted computations. Hence, while malicious quantum computers are rendered harmless by blind and verifiable protocols, inherent noise severely limits their usability. We address this problem with an efficient, robust, blind, verifiable scheme to delegate deterministic quantum computations with classical inputs and outputs. We show that: 1) a malicious Server can cheat at most with an exponentially small success probability; 2) in case of sufficiently small noise, the protocol succeeds with a probability exponentially close to 1; 3) the overhead is barely a polynomial number of repetitions of the initial computation interleaved with test runs requiring the same physical resources in terms of memory and gates; 4) the amount of tolerable noise, measured by the probability of failing a test run, can be as high as 25% for some computations and will be generally bounded by 12.5% when using a planar graph resource state. The key points are that security can be provided without universal computation graphs and that, in our setting, full fault-tolerance is not needed to amplify the confidence level exponentially close to 1.