Paul Gratz

Gino Chacon, Tapojyoti Mandal, Johann Knechtel et al.

Industry is moving towards large-scale systems where processor cores, memories, accelerators, etc.\ are bundled via 2.5D integration. These various components are fabricated separately as chiplets and then integrated using an interconnect carrier, a so-called interposer. This new design style provides benefits in terms of yield as well as economies of scale, as chiplets may come from various third-party vendors, and be integrated into one sophisticated system. The benefits of this approach, however, come at the cost of new challenges for the system's security and integrity when many third-party component chiplets, some from not fully trusted vendors, are integrated. Here, we explore these challenges, but also promises, for modern interposer-based systems of cache-coherent, multi-core chiplets. First, we introduce a new, coherence-based attack, GETXspy, wherein a single compromised chiplet can expose a high-bandwidth side/covert-channel in an ostensibly secure system. We further show that prior art is insufficient to stop this new attack. Second, we propose using an active interposer as generic, secure-by-construction platform that forms a physical root of trust for modern 2.5D systems. Our scheme has limited overhead, restricted to the active interposer, allowing the chiplets and the coherence system to remain untouched. We show that our scheme prevents a wide range of attacks, including but not limited to our GETXspy attack, with little overhead on system performance, $\sim$4\%. This overhead reduces as workloads increase, ensuring scalability of the scheme.

Erick Carvajal Barboza, Sara Jacob, Mahesh Ketkar et al.

Processor design validation and debug is a difficult and complex task, which consumes the lion's share of the design process. Design bugs that affect processor performance rather than its functionality are especially difficult to catch, particularly in new microarchitectures. This is because, unlike functional bugs, the correct processor performance of new microarchitectures on complex, long-running benchmarks is typically not deterministically known. Thus, when performance benchmarking new microarchitectures, performance teams may assume that the design is correct when the performance of the new microarchitecture exceeds that of the previous generation, despite significant performance regressions existing in the design. In this work, we present a two-stage, machine learning-based methodology that is able to detect the existence of performance bugs in microprocessors. Our results show that our best technique detects 91.5% of microprocessor core performance bugs whose average IPC impact across the studied applications is greater than 1% versus a bug-free design with zero false positives. When evaluated on memory system bugs, our technique achieves 100% detection with zero false positives. Moreover, the detection is automatic, requiring very little performance engineer time.