Christophe Garion

Martin Boniol, Julien Brunel, Jean-Baptiste Chaudron et al.

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xu (ACAS-Xu) relies on large certified Look-Up Tables (LUTs) that encode the exact decision logic used in operation. Neural-network-based approximations have been proposed to reduce memory requirements, but they inherently introduce approximation errors and complicate formal verification. This paper presents a symbolic compression approach based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) that preserves the exact semantics of the ACAS-Xu LUTs. The resulting representation is canonical, deterministic, and fully equivalent to the original tables, enabling sound and exact reasoning over the complete decision logic. By expressing both the system behavior and domain-specific operational properties within a common Boolean framework, verification reduces to efficient BDD operations and emptiness checks, with precise counterexamples generated when properties are violated. We demonstrate that the proposed BDD-based representation significantly reduces memory usage, achieves predictable and low-latency execution, and can be deployed on embedded platforms. These results highlight BDDs as a compelling alternative for exact, verifiable, and embedded deployment of ACAS-Xu decision logic.

Arthur Clavière, Eric Asselin, Christophe Garion et al.

In this paper, we propose a system-level approach for verifying the safety of neural network controlled systems, combining a continuous-time physical system with a discrete-time neural network based controller. We assume a generic model for the controller that can capture both simple and complex behaviours involving neural networks. Based on this model, we perform a reachability analysis that soundly approximates the reachable states of the overall system, allowing to achieve a formal proof of safety. To this end, we leverage both validated simulation to approximate the behaviour of the physical system and abstract interpretation to approximate the behaviour of the controller. We evaluate the applicability of our approach using a real-world use case. Moreover, we show that our approach can provide valuable information when the system cannot be proved totally safe.