Alexander Teytelboym

Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Akihisa Tamura et al.

We consider a model of matching in trading networks in which firms can enter into bilateral contracts. In trading networks, stable outcomes, which are immune to deviations of arbitrary sets of firms, may not exist. We define a new solution concept called trail stability. Trail-stable outcomes are immune to consecutive, pairwise deviations between linked firms. We show that any trading network with bilateral contracts has a trail-stable outcome whenever firms' choice functions satisfy the full substitutability condition. For trail-stable outcomes, we prove results on the lattice structure, the rural hospitals theorem, strategy-proofness, and comparative statics of firm entry and exit. We also introduce weak trail stability which is implied by trail stability under full substitutability. We describe relationships between the solution concepts.

Maximilian Kasy, Alexander Teytelboym

We consider settings where an allocation has to be chosen repeatedly, returns are unknown but can be learned, and decisions are subject to constraints. Our model covers two-sided and one-sided matching, even with complex constraints. We propose an approach based on Thompson sampling. Our main result is a prior-independent finite-sample bound on the expected regret for this algorithm. Although the number of allocations grows exponentially in the number of participants, the bound does not depend on this number. We illustrate the performance of our algorithm using data on refugee resettlement in the United States.