Juan M. Durán

Juan Manuel Durán

This chapter is interested in the epistemology of algorithms. As I intend to approach the topic, this is an issue about epistemic justification. Current approaches to justification emphasize the transparency of algorithms, which entails elucidating their internal mechanisms -- such as functions and variables -- and demonstrating how (or that) these produce outputs. Thus, the mode of justification through transparency is contingent on what can be shown about the algorithm and, in this sense, is internal to the algorithm. In contrast, I advocate for an externalist epistemology of algorithms that I term computational reliabilism (CR). While I have previously introduced and examined CR in the field of computer simulations ([42, 53, 4]), this chapter extends this reliabilist epistemology to encompass a broader spectrum of algorithms utilized in various scientific disciplines, with a particular emphasis on machine learning applications. At its core, CR posits that an algorithm's output is justified if it is produced by a reliable algorithm. A reliable algorithm is one that has been specified, coded, used, and maintained utilizing reliability indicators. These reliability indicators stem from formal methods, algorithmic metrics, expert competencies, cultures of research, and other scientific endeavors. The primary aim of this chapter is to delineate the foundations of CR, explicate its operational mechanisms, and outline its potential as an externalist epistemology of algorithms.

Andrea Ferrario, Alessandro Facchini, Juan M. Durán

Human-AI complementarity is the claim that a human supported by an AI system can outperform either alone in a decision-making process. Since its introduction in the human-AI interaction literature, it has gained traction by generalizing the reliance paradigm and by offering a more practical alternative to the contested construct of 'trust in AI.' Yet complementarity faces key theoretical challenges: it lacks precise theoretical anchoring, it is formalized just as a post hoc indicator of relative predictive accuracy, it remains silent about other desiderata of human-AI interactions and it abstracts away from the magnitude-cost profile of its performance gain. As a result, complementarity is difficult to obtain in empirical settings. In this work, we leverage epistemology to address these challenges by reframing complementarity within the discourse on justificatory AI. Drawing on computational reliabilism, we argue that historical instances of complementarity function as evidence that a given human-AI interaction is a reliable epistemic process for a given predictive task. Together with other reliability indicators assessing the alignment of the human-AI team with the epistemic standards and socio-technical practices, complementarity contributes to the degree of reliability of human-AI teams when generating predictions. This supports the practical reasoning of those affected by these outputs -- patients, managers, regulators, and others. In summary, our approach suggests that the role and value of complementarity lies not in providing a relative measure of predictive accuracy, but in helping calibrate decision-making to the reliability of AI-supported processes that increasingly shape everyday life.