Henri Prade

Didier Dubois, Lluis Godo, Henri Prade

Non-additive uncertainty theories, typically possibility theory, belief functions and imprecise probabilities share a common feature with modal logic: the duality properties between possibility and necessity measures, belief and plausibility functions as well as between upper and lower probabilities extend the duality between possibility and necessity modalities to the graded environment. It has been shown that the all-or-nothing version of possibility theory can be exactly captured by a minimal epistemic logic (MEL) that uses a very small fragment of the KD modal logic, without resorting to relational semantics. Besides, the case of belief functions has been studied independently, and a belief function logic has been obtained by extending the modal logic S5 to graded modalities using Łukasiewicz logic, albeit using relational semantics. This paper shows that a simpler belief function logic can be devised by adding Łukasiewicz logic on top of MEL. It allows for a more natural semantics in terms of Shafer basic probability assignments.

Florence Dupin de Saint Cyr - Bannay, Henri Prade

Incongruity often makes people laugh. You have to be smart to say stupid things. It requires to be even smarter for understanding them. This paper is a shameless attempt to formalize this intelligent behavior in the case of an agent listening to a joke. All this is a matter of revision of beliefs, surprise and violation of norms.

Kathryn Laskey, Henri Prade

This is the Proceedings of the Fifteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, which was held in Stockholm Sweden, July 30 - August 1, 1999

Didier Dubois, Henri Prade

This paper advocates the usefulness of new theories of uncertainty for the purpose of modeling some facets of uncertain knowledge, especially vagueness, in AI. It can be viewed as a partial reply to Cheeseman's (among others) defense of probability.

Didier Dubois, Jerome Lang, Henri Prade

In this paper an approach to automated deduction under uncertainty,based on possibilistic logic, is proposed ; for that purpose we deal with clauses weighted by a degree which is a lower bound of a necessity or a possibility measure, according to the nature of the uncertainty. Two resolution rules are used for coping with the different situations, and the refutation method can be generalized. Besides the lower bounds are allowed to be functions of variables involved in the clause, which gives hypothetical reasoning capabilities. The relation between our approach and the idea of minimizing abnormality is briefly discussed. In case where only lower bounds of necessity measures are involved, a semantics is proposed, in which the completeness of the extended resolution principle is proved. Moreover deduction from a partially inconsistent knowledge base can be managed in this approach and displays some form of non-monotonicity.

Didier Dubois, Henri Prade

This paper discusses how a measure of uncertainty representing a state of knowledge can be updated when a new information, which may be pervaded with uncertainty, becomes available. This problem is considered in various framework, namely: Shafer's evidence theory, Zadeh's possibility theory, Spohn's theory of epistemic states. In the two first cases, analogues of Jeffrey's rule of conditioning are introduced and discussed. The relations between Spohn's model and possibility theory are emphasized and Spohn's updating rule is contrasted with the Jeffrey-like rule of conditioning in possibility theory. Recent results by Shenoy on the combination of ordinal conditional functions are reinterpreted in the language of possibility theory. It is shown that Shenoy's combination rule has a well-known possibilistic counterpart.

Salem Benferhat, Didier Dubois, Henri Prade

This paper presents and discusses several methods for reasoning from inconsistent knowledge bases. A so-called argumentative-consequence relation taking into account the existence of consistent arguments in favor of a conclusion and the absence of consistent arguments in favor of its contrary, is particularly investigated. Flat knowledge bases, i.e. without any priority between their elements, as well as prioritized ones where some elements are considered as more strongly entrenched than others are studied under different consequence relations. Lastly a paraconsistent-like treatment of prioritized knowledge bases is proposed, where both the level of entrenchment and the level of paraconsistency attached to a formula are propagated. The priority levels are handled in the framework of possibility theory.

Didier Dubois, Henri Prade

Relational models for diagnosis are based on a direct description of the association between disorders and manifestations. This type of model has been specially used and developed by Reggia and his co-workers in the late eighties as a basic starting point for approaching diagnosis problems. The paper proposes a new relational model which includes Reggia's model as a particular case and which allows for a more expressive representation of the observations and of the manifestations associated with disorders. The model distinguishes, i) between manifestations which are certainly absent and those which are not (yet) observed, and ii) between manifestations which cannot be caused by a given disorder and manifestations for which we do not know if they can or cannot be caused by this disorder. This new model, which can handle uncertainty in a non-probabilistic way, is based on possibility theory and so-called twofold fuzzy sets, previously introduced by the authors.

Didier Dubois, Henri Prade

Accepting a proposition means that our confidence in this proposition is strictly greater than the confidence in its negation. This paper investigates the subclass of uncertainty measures, expressing confidence, that capture the idea of acceptance, what we call acceptance functions. Due to the monotonicity property of confidence measures, the acceptance of a proposition entails the acceptance of any of its logical consequences. In agreement with the idea that a belief set (in the sense of Gardenfors) must be closed under logical consequence, it is also required that the separate acceptance o two propositions entail the acceptance of their conjunction. Necessity (and possibility) measures agree with this view of acceptance while probability and belief functions generally do not. General properties of acceptance functions are estabilished. The motivation behind this work is the investigation of a setting for belief revision more general than the one proposed by Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson, in connection with the notion of conditioning.

Didier Cayrac, Didier Dubois, Henri Prade

An approach to fault isolation that exploits vastly incomplete models is presented. It relies on separate descriptions of each component behavior, together with the links between them, which enables focusing of the reasoning to the relevant part of the system. As normal observations do not need explanation, the behavior of the components is limited to anomaly propagation. Diagnostic solutions are disorders (fault modes or abnormal signatures) that are consistent with the observations, as well as abductive explanations. An ordinal representation of uncertainty based on possibility theory provides a simple exception-tolerant description of the component behaviors. We can for instance distinguish between effects that are more or less certainly present (or absent) and effects that are more or less certainly present (or absent) when a given anomaly is present. A realistic example illustrates the benefits of this approach.

Didier Dubois, Henri Prade

This paper discusses belief revision under uncertain inputs in the framework of possibility theory. Revision can be based on two possible definitions of the conditioning operation, one based on min operator which requires a purely ordinal scale only, and another based on product, for which a richer structure is needed, and which is a particular case of Dempster's rule of conditioning. Besides, revision under uncertain inputs can be understood in two different ways depending on whether the input is viewed, or not, as a constraint to enforce. Moreover, it is shown that M.A. Williams' transmutations, originally defined in the setting of Spohn's functions, can be captured in this framework, as well as Boutilier's natural revision.

Didier Dubois, Helene Fargier, Henri Prade

This paper investigates the problem of finding a preference relation on a set of acts from the knowledge of an ordering on events (subsets of states of the world) describing the decision-maker (DM)s uncertainty and an ordering of consequences of acts, describing the DMs preferences. However, contrary to classical approaches to decision theory, we try to do it without resorting to any numerical representation of utility nor uncertainty, and without even using any qualitative scale on which both uncertainty and preference could be mapped. It is shown that although many axioms of Savage theory can be preserved and despite the intuitive appeal of the method for constructing a preference over acts, the approach is inconsistent with a probabilistic representation of uncertainty, but leads to the kind of uncertainty theory encountered in non-monotonic reasoning (especially preferential and rational inference), closely related to possibility theory. Moreover the method turns out to be either very little decisive or to lead to very risky decisions, although its basic principles look sound. This paper raises the question of the very possibility of purely symbolic approaches to Savage-like decision-making under uncertainty and obtains preliminary negative results.

Didier Dubois, Michel Grabisch, Henri Prade et al.

The problem of assessing the value of a candidate is viewed here as a multiple combination problem. On the one hand a candidate can be evaluated according to different criteria, and on the other hand several experts are supposed to assess the value of candidates according to each criterion. Criteria are not equally important, experts are not equally competent or reliable. Moreover levels of satisfaction of criteria, or levels of confidence are only assumed to take their values in qualitative scales which are just linearly ordered. The problem is discussed within two frameworks, the transferable belief model and the qualitative possibility theory. They respectively offer a quantitative and a qualitative setting for handling the problem, providing thus a way to compare the nature of the underlying assumptions.

Salem Benferhat, Didier Dubois, Laurent Garcia et al.

Possibilistic logic bases and possibilistic graphs are two different frameworks of interest for representing knowledge. The former stratifies the pieces of knowledge (expressed by logical formulas) according to their level of certainty, while the latter exhibits relationships between variables. The two types of representations are semantically equivalent when they lead to the same possibility distribution (which rank-orders the possible interpretations). A possibility distribution can be decomposed using a chain rule which may be based on two different kinds of conditioning which exist in possibility theory (one based on product in a numerical setting, one based on minimum operation in a qualitative setting). These two types of conditioning induce two kinds of possibilistic graphs. In both cases, a translation of these graphs into possibilistic bases is provided. The converse translation from a possibilistic knowledge base into a min-based graph is also described.

Salem Benferhat, Didier Dubois, Souhila Kaci et al.

Possibilistic logic offers a qualitative framework for representing pieces of information associated with levels of uncertainty of priority. The fusion of multiple sources information is discussed in this setting. Different classes of merging operators are considered including conjunctive, disjunctive, reinforcement, adaptive and averaging operators. Then we propose to analyse these classes in terms of postulates. This is done by first extending the postulate for merging classical bases to the case where priorites are avaialbe.

Leila Amgoud, Henri Prade

Humans currently use arguments for explaining choices which are already made, or for evaluating potential choices. Each potential choice has usually pros and cons of various strengths. In spite of the usefulness of arguments in a decision making process, there have been few formal proposals handling this idea if we except works by Fox and Parsons and by Bonet and Geffner. In this paper we propose a possibilistic logic framework where arguments are built from an uncertain knowledge base and a set of prioritized goals. The proposed approach can compute two kinds of decisions by distinguishing between pessimistic and optimistic attitudes. When the available, maybe uncertain, knowledge is consistent, as well as the set of prioritized goals (which have to be fulfilled as far as possible), the method for evaluating decisions on the basis of arguments agrees with the possibility theory-based approach to decision-making under uncertainty. Taking advantage of its relation with formal approaches to defeasible argumentation, the proposed framework can be generalized in case of partially inconsistent knowledge, or goal bases.