Lily Weng

Akhilan Boopathy, Tsui-Wei Weng, Sijia Liu et al.

Recent works have developed several methods of defending neural networks against adversarial attacks with certified guarantees. However, these techniques can be computationally costly due to the use of certification during training. We develop a new regularizer that is both more efficient than existing certified defenses, requiring only one additional forward propagation through a network, and can be used to train networks with similar certified accuracy. Through experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 we demonstrate improvements in training speed and comparable certified accuracy compared to state-of-the-art certified defenses.

Ching-Yun Ko, Zhaoyang Lyu, Tsui-Wei Weng et al.

The vulnerability to adversarial attacks has been a critical issue for deep neural networks. Addressing this issue requires a reliable way to evaluate the robustness of a network. Recently, several methods have been developed to compute $\textit{robustness quantification}$ for neural networks, namely, certified lower bounds of the minimum adversarial perturbation. Such methods, however, were devised for feed-forward networks, e.g. multi-layer perceptron or convolutional networks. It remains an open problem to quantify robustness for recurrent networks, especially LSTM and GRU. For such networks, there exist additional challenges in computing the robustness quantification, such as handling the inputs at multiple steps and the interaction between gates and states. In this work, we propose $\textit{POPQORN}$ ($\textbf{P}$ropagated-$\textbf{o}$ut$\textbf{p}$ut $\textbf{Q}$uantified R$\textbf{o}$bustness for $\textbf{RN}$Ns), a general algorithm to quantify robustness of RNNs, including vanilla RNNs, LSTMs, and GRUs. We demonstrate its effectiveness on different network architectures and show that the robustness quantification on individual steps can lead to new insights.