GTSep 22, 2023
Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain ResourcesDavide Crapis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Shouqiao Wang
We develop a general and practical framework to address the problem of the optimal design of dynamic fee mechanisms for multiple blockchain resources. Our framework allows to compute policies that optimally trade-off between adjusting resource prices to handle persistent demand shifts versus being robust to local noise in the observed block demand. In the general case with more than one resource, our optimal policies correctly handle cross-effects (complementarity and substitutability) in resource demands. We also show how these cross-effects can be used to inform resource design, i.e. combining resources into bundles that have low demand-side cross-effects can yield simpler and more efficient price-update rules. Our framework is also practical, we demonstrate how it can be used to refine or inform the design of heuristic fee update rules such as EIP-1559 or EIP-4844 with two case studies. We then estimate a uni-dimensional version of our model using real market data from the Ethereum blockchain and empirically compare the performance of our optimal policies to EIP-1559.
AINov 5, 2025
Outbidding and Outbluffing Elite Humans: Mastering Liar's Poker via Self-Play and Reinforcement LearningRichard Dewey, Janos Botyanszki, Ciamac C. Moallemi et al.
AI researchers have long focused on poker-like games as a testbed for environments characterized by multi-player dynamics, imperfect information, and reasoning under uncertainty. While recent breakthroughs have matched elite human play at no-limit Texas hold'em, the multi-player dynamics are subdued: most hands converge quickly with only two players engaged through multiple rounds of bidding. In this paper, we present Solly, the first AI agent to achieve elite human play in reduced-format Liar's Poker, a game characterized by extensive multi-player engagement. We trained Solly using self-play with a model-free, actor-critic, deep reinforcement learning algorithm. Solly played at an elite human level as measured by win rate (won over 50% of hands) and equity (money won) in heads-up and multi-player Liar's Poker. Solly also outperformed large language models (LLMs), including those with reasoning abilities, on the same metrics. Solly developed novel bidding strategies, randomized play effectively, and was not easily exploitable by world-class human players.
LGJun 30, 2020
Policy Gradient Optimization of Thompson Sampling PoliciesSeungki Min, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Daniel J. Russo
We study the use of policy gradient algorithms to optimize over a class of generalized Thompson sampling policies. Our central insight is to view the posterior parameter sampled by Thompson sampling as a kind of pseudo-action. Policy gradient methods can then be tractably applied to search over a class of sampling policies, which determine a probability distribution over pseudo-actions (i.e., sampled parameters) as a function of observed data. We also propose and compare policy gradient estimators that are specialized to Bayesian bandit problems. Numerical experiments demonstrate that direct policy search on top of Thompson sampling automatically corrects for some of the algorithm's known shortcomings and offers meaningful improvements even in long horizon problems where standard Thompson sampling is extremely effective.
LGFeb 12, 2019
Thompson Sampling with Information Relaxation PenaltiesSeungki Min, Costis Maglaras, Ciamac C. Moallemi
We consider a finite-horizon multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem in a Bayesian setting, for which we propose an information relaxation sampling framework. With this framework, we define an intuitive family of control policies that include Thompson sampling (TS) and the Bayesian optimal policy as endpoints. Analogous to TS, which, at each decision epoch pulls an arm that is best with respect to the randomly sampled parameters, our algorithms sample entire future reward realizations and take the corresponding best action. However, this is done in the presence of "penalties" that seek to compensate for the availability of future information. We develop several novel policies and performance bounds for MAB problems that vary in terms of improving performance and increasing computational complexity between the two endpoints. Our policies can be viewed as natural generalizations of TS that simultaneously incorporate knowledge of the time horizon and explicitly consider the exploration-exploitation trade-off. We prove associated structural results on performance bounds and suboptimality gaps. Numerical experiments suggest that this new class of policies perform well, in particular in settings where the finite time horizon introduces significant exploration-exploitation tension into the problem. Finally, inspired by the finite-horizon Gittins index, we propose an index policy that builds on our framework that particularly outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithms in our numerical experiments.