Usama Mehmood

Usama Mehmood, Nicola Paoletti, Dung Phan et al.

The popularity of rule-based flocking models, such as Reynolds' classic flocking model, raises the question of whether more declarative flocking models are possible. This question is motivated by the observation that declarative models are generally simpler and easier to design, understand, and analyze than operational models. We introduce a very simple control law for flocking based on a cost function capturing cohesion (agents want to stay together) and separation (agents do not want to get too close). We refer to it as {\textit declarative flocking} (DF). We use model-predictive control (MPC) to define controllers for DF in centralized and distributed settings. A thorough performance comparison of our declarative flocking with Reynolds' model, and with more recent flocking models that use MPC with a cost function based on lattice structures, demonstrate that DF-MPC yields the best cohesion and least fragmentation, and maintains a surprisingly good level of geometric regularity while still producing natural flock shapes similar to those produced by Reynolds' model. We also show that DF-MPC has high resilience to sensor noise.

Dung Phan, Scott A. Smolka, Radu Grosu et al.

We present a novel approach to the problem of model checking cyber-physical systems. We transform the model checking problem to an optimization one by designing an objective function that measures how close a state is to a violation of a property. We use particle swarm optimization (PSO) to effectively search for a state that minimizes the objective function. Such states, if found, are counter-examples describing safe states from which the system can reach an unsafe state in one time step. We illustrate our approach with a controller for the Quickbot ground rover. Our PSO model checker quickly found a bug in the controller that could cause the rover to collide with an obstacle.

Usama Mehmood, Sanaz Sheikhi, Stanley Bak et al.

The Simplex Architecture is a runtime assurance framework where control authority may switch from an unverified and potentially unsafe advanced controller to a backup baseline controller in order to maintain the safety of an autonomous cyber-physical system. In this work, we show that runtime checks can replace the requirement to statically verify safety of the baseline controller. This is important as there are many powerful control techniques, such as model-predictive control and neural network controllers, that work well in practice but are difficult to statically verify. Since the method does not use internal information about the advanced or baseline controller, we call the approach the Black-Box Simplex Architecture. We prove the architecture is safe and present two case studies where (i) model-predictive control provides safe multi-robot coordination, and (ii) neural networks provably prevent collisions in groups of F-16 aircraft, despite the controllers occasionally outputting unsafe commands.