Kentaro Ozeki

Kentaro Ozeki, Risako Ando, Takanobu Morishita et al.

This paper explores the question of how accurately current large language models can perform logical reasoning in natural language, with an emphasis on whether these models exhibit reasoning biases similar to humans. Specifically, our study focuses on syllogistic reasoning, a form of deductive reasoning extensively studied in cognitive science as a natural form of human reasoning. We present a syllogism dataset called NeuBAROCO, which consists of syllogistic reasoning problems in English and Japanese. This dataset was originally designed for psychological experiments to assess human reasoning capabilities using various forms of syllogisms. Our experiments with leading large language models indicate that these models exhibit reasoning biases similar to humans, along with other error tendencies. Notably, there is significant room for improvement in reasoning problems where the relationship between premises and hypotheses is neither entailment nor contradiction. We also present experimental results and in-depth analysis using a new Chain-of-Thought prompting method, which asks LLMs to translate syllogisms into abstract logical expressions and then explain their reasoning process. Our analysis using this method suggests that the primary limitations of LLMs lie in the reasoning process itself rather than the interpretation of syllogisms.

Hirohiko Abe, Kentaro Ozeki, Risako Ando et al.

As large language models (LLMs) advance in linguistic competence, their reasoning abilities are gaining increasing attention. In humans, reasoning often performs well in domain specific settings, particularly in normative rather than purely formal contexts. Although prior studies have compared LLM and human reasoning, the domain specificity of LLM reasoning remains underexplored. In this study, we introduce a new Wason Selection Task dataset that explicitly encodes deontic modality to systematically distinguish deontic from descriptive conditionals, and use it to examine LLMs' conditional reasoning under deontic rules. We further analyze whether observed error patterns are better explained by confirmation bias (a tendency to seek rule-supporting evidence) or by matching bias (a tendency to ignore negation and select items that lexically match elements of the rule). Results show that, like humans, LLMs reason better with deontic rules and display matching-bias-like errors. Together, these findings suggest that the performance of LLMs varies systematically across rule types and that their error patterns can parallel well-known human biases in this paradigm.