AIApr 7, 2023
Why think step by step? Reasoning emerges from the locality of experienceBen Prystawski, Michael Y. Li, Noah D. Goodman
Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. Working through a set of mental steps enables us to make inferences we would not be capable of making directly even though we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they would directly. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of overlapping local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables reduces bias, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis experimentally in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables. The combination of locally structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.
CLSep 16, 2022
Psychologically-informed chain-of-thought prompts for metaphor understanding in large language modelsBen Prystawski, Paul Thibodeau, Christopher Potts et al.
Probabilistic models of language understanding are valuable tools for investigating human language use. However, they need to be hand-designed for a particular domain. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) are trained on text that spans a wide array of domains, but they lack the structure and interpretability of probabilistic models. In this paper, we use chain-of-thought prompts to introduce structures from probabilistic models into LLMs. We explore this approach in the case of metaphor understanding. Our chain-of-thought prompts lead language models to infer latent variables and reason about their relationships in order to choose appropriate paraphrases for metaphors. The latent variables and relationships chosen are informed by theories of metaphor understanding from cognitive psychology. We apply these prompts to the two largest versions of GPT-3 and show that they can improve performance in a paraphrase selection task.
AIMay 27
CORE: Contrastive Reflection Enables Rapid Improvements in ReasoningLinas Nasvytis, Simon Jerome Han, Ben Prystawski et al.
Language models can use verifiable rewards to improve at a wide variety of reasoning tasks. However, both parametric (e.g. RLVR) and non-parametric (e.g. prompt optimization) approaches to doing so typically require hundreds of training samples and thousands of model rollouts, making them expensive in the best case and intractable in the worst. To address this challenge, we introduce Contrastive Reflection (CORE), a non-parametric learning algorithm that compares past reasoning traces to generate insights: short natural-language descriptions of reasoning strategies and constraints that capture differences between successful and unsuccessful problem attempts. Across four reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that CORE enables more rapid improvement than both parametric (GRPO) and non-parametric (GEPA, episodic RAG, and MemRL) methods, while using fewer rollouts. Under fixed rollout budgets with as few as five training samples, we then show that CORE also achieves comparable or greater performance gains than each baseline. Finally, we highlight how CORE is also substantially more context-efficient than non-parametric baselines, requiring fewer prompt tokens while storing learned knowledge as compact, interpretable natural-language insights. Our results therefore suggest that distilling contrasts between successful and unsuccessful reasoning traces into abstract and useful insights can provide a more efficient and interpretable route to model self-improvement than weight updates, prompt optimization, or direct reuse of stored reasoning traces.
AIFeb 6, 2023
Toward a normative theory of (self-)management by goal-settingNishad Singhi, Florian Mohnert, Ben Prystawski et al.
People are often confronted with problems whose complexity exceeds their cognitive capacities. To deal with this complexity, individuals and managers can break complex problems down into a series of subgoals. Which subgoals are most effective depends on people's cognitive constraints and the cognitive mechanisms of goal pursuit. This creates an untapped opportunity to derive practical recommendations for which subgoals managers and individuals should set from cognitive models of bounded rationality. To seize this opportunity, we apply the principle of resource-rationality to formulate a mathematically precise normative theory of (self-)management by goal-setting. We leverage this theory to computationally derive optimal subgoals from a resource-rational model of human goal pursuit. Finally, we show that the resulting subgoals improve the problem-solving performance of bounded agents and human participants. This constitutes a first step towards grounding prescriptive theories of management and practical recommendations for goal-setting in computational models of the relevant psychological processes and cognitive limitations.
CLNov 5, 2025
Context informs pragmatic interpretation in vision-language modelsAlvin Wei Ming Tan, Ben Prystawski, Veronica Boyce et al.
Iterated reference games - in which players repeatedly pick out novel referents using language - present a test case for agents' ability to perform context-sensitive pragmatic reasoning in multi-turn linguistic environments. We tested humans and vision-language models on trials from iterated reference games, varying the given context in terms of amount, order, and relevance. Without relevant context, models were above chance but substantially worse than humans. However, with relevant context, model performance increased dramatically over trials. Few-shot reference games with abstract referents remain a difficult task for machine learning models.
CLMay 29, 2025
Scaling up the think-aloud methodDaniel Wurgaft, Ben Prystawski, Kanishk Gandhi et al.
The think-aloud method, where participants voice their thoughts as they solve a task, is a valuable source of rich data about human reasoning processes. Yet, it has declined in popularity in contemporary cognitive science, largely because labor-intensive transcription and annotation preclude large sample sizes. Here, we develop methods to automate the transcription and annotation of verbal reports of reasoning using natural language processing tools, allowing for large-scale analysis of think-aloud data. In our study, 640 participants thought aloud while playing the Game of 24, a mathematical reasoning task. We automatically transcribed the recordings and coded the transcripts as search graphs, finding moderate inter-rater reliability with humans. We analyze these graphs and characterize consistency and variation in human reasoning traces. Our work demonstrates the value of think-aloud data at scale and serves as a proof of concept for the automated analysis of verbal reports.
AIAug 26, 2025
Language and Experience: A Computational Model of Social Learning in Complex TasksCédric Colas, Tracey Mills, Ben Prystawski et al.
The ability to combine linguistic guidance from others with direct experience is central to human development, enabling safe and rapid learning in new environments. How do people integrate these two sources of knowledge, and how might AI systems? We present a computational framework that models social learning as joint probabilistic inference over structured, executable world models given sensorimotor and linguistic data. We make this possible by turning a pretrained language model into a probabilistic model of how humans share advice conditioned on their beliefs, allowing our agents both to generate advice for others and to interpret linguistic input as evidence during Bayesian inference. Using behavioral experiments and simulations across 10 video games, we show how linguistic guidance can shape exploration and accelerate learning by reducing risky interactions and speeding up key discoveries in both humans and models. We further explore how knowledge can accumulate across generations through iterated learning experiments and demonstrate successful knowledge transfer between humans and models -- revealing how structured, language-compatible representations might enable human-machine collaborative learning.