Michael Lentmaier

Anish Shastri, Neharika Valecha, Enver Bashirov et al.

The commercial availability of low-cost millimeter wave (mmWave) communication and radar devices is starting to improve the penetration of such technologies in consumer markets, paving the way for large-scale and dense deployments in fifth-generation (5G)-and-beyond as well as 6G networks. At the same time, pervasive mmWave access will enable device localization and device-free sensing with unprecedented accuracy, especially with respect to sub-6 GHz commercial-grade devices. This paper surveys the state of the art in device-based localization and device-free sensing using mmWave communication and radar devices, with a focus on indoor deployments. We first overview key concepts about mmWave signal propagation and system design. Then, we provide a detailed account of approaches and algorithms for localization and sensing enabled by mmWaves. We consider several dimensions in our analysis, including the main objectives, techniques, and performance of each work, whether each research reached some degree of implementation, and which hardware platforms were used for this purpose. We conclude by discussing that better algorithms for consumer-grade devices, data fusion methods for dense deployments, as well as an educated application of machine learning methods are promising, relevant and timely research directions.

Jing Yang, Qian Guo, Thomas Johansson et al.

Local pseudorandom generators are a class of fundamental cryptographic primitives having very broad applications in theoretical cryptography. Following Couteau et al.'s work in ASIACRYPT 2018, this paper further studies the concrete security of one important class of local pseudorandom generators, i.e., Goldreich's pseudorandom generators. Our first attack is of the guess-and-determine type. Our result significantly improves the state-of-the-art algorithm proposed by Couteau et al., in terms of both asymptotic and concrete complexity, and breaks all the challenge parameters they proposed. For instance, for a parameter set suggested for 128 bits of security, we could solve the instance faster by a factor of about $2^{61}$, thereby destroying the claimed security completely. Our second attack further exploits the extremely sparse structure of the predicate $P_5$ and combines ideas from iterative decoding. This novel attack, named guess-and-decode, substantially improves the guess-and-determine approaches for cryptographic-relevant parameters. All the challenge parameter sets proposed in Couteau et al.'s work in ASIACRYPT 2018 aiming for 80-bit (128-bit) security levels can be solved in about $2^{58}$ ($2^{78}$) operations. We suggest new parameters for achieving 80-bit (128-bit) security with respect to our attacks. We also extend the attack to other promising predicates and investigate their resistance.