Qinnan Zhang

Lingxiang Wang, Hainan Zhang, Qinnan Zhang et al.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at generating code from natural language instructions, yet they often lack an understanding of security vulnerabilities. This limitation makes it difficult for LLMs to avoid security risks in generated code, particularly in high-security programming tasks such as smart contract development for blockchain. Researchers have attempted to enhance the vulnerability awareness of these models by training them to differentiate between vulnerable and fixed code snippets. However, this approach relies heavily on manually labeled vulnerability data, which is only available for popular languages like Python and C++. For low-resource languages like Solidity, used in smart contracts, large-scale annotated datasets are scarce and difficult to obtain. To address this challenge, we introduce CodeBC, a code generation model specifically designed for generating secure smart contracts in blockchain. CodeBC employs a three-stage fine-tuning approach based on CodeLlama, distinguishing itself from previous methods by not relying on pairwise vulnerability location annotations. Instead, it leverages vulnerability and security tags to teach the model the differences between vulnerable and secure code. During the inference phase, the model leverages security tags to generate secure and robust code. Experimental results demonstrate that CodeBC outperforms baseline models in terms of BLEU, CodeBLEU, and compilation pass rates, while significantly reducing vulnerability rates. These findings validate the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of our three-stage fine-tuning strategy, making CodeBC a promising solution for generating secure smart contract code.

Jinwen Chen, Hainan Zhang, Fei Sun et al.

Stealthy data poisoning during fine-tuning can backdoor large language models (LLMs), threatening downstream safety. Existing detectors either use classifier-style probability signals--ill-suited to generation--or rely on rewriting, which can degrade quality and even introduce new triggers. We address the practical need to efficiently remove poisoned examples before or during fine-tuning. We observe a robust signal in the response space: after applying TF-IDF to model responses, poisoned examples form compact clusters (driven by consistent malicious outputs), while clean examples remain dispersed. We leverage this with RFTC--Reference-Filtration + TF-IDF Clustering. RFTC first compares each example's response with that of a reference model and flags those with large deviations as suspicious; it then performs TF-IDF clustering on the suspicious set and identifies true poisoned examples using intra-class distance. On two machine translation datasets and one QA dataset, RFTC outperforms prior detectors in both detection accuracy and the downstream performance of the fine-tuned models. Ablations with different reference models further validate the effectiveness and robustness of Reference-Filtration.