Hamidreza Tavafoghi

Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Kameshwar Poolla, Pravin Varaiya

We present a queuing model of parking dynamics and a model-based prediction method to provide real-time probabilistic forecasts of future parking occupancy. The queuing model has a non-homogeneous arrival rate and time-varying service time distribution. All statistical assumptions of the model are verified using data from 29 truck parking locations, each with between 55 and 299 parking spots. For each location and each spot the data specifies the arrival and departure times of a truck, for 16 months of operation. The modeling framework presented in this paper provides empirical support for queuing models adopted in many theoretical studies and policy designs. We discuss how our framework can be used to study parking problems in different environments. Based on the queuing model, we propose two prediction methods, a microscopic method and a macroscopic method, that provide a real-time probabilistic forecast of parking occupancy for an arbitrary forecast horizon. These model-based methods convert a probabilistic forecast problem into a parameter estimation problem that can be tackled using classical estimation methods such as regressions or pure machine learning algorithms. We characterize a lower bound for an arbitrary real-time prediction algorithm. We evaluate the performance of these methods using the truck data comparing the outcomes of their implementations with other model-based and model-free methods proposed in the literature.

Yi Ouyang, Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demosthenis Teneketzis

We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the system over time. Because of the presence of asymmetric information, each agent needs to form beliefs about other agents' private information. Therefore, the specification of the agents' beliefs along with their strategies is necessary to study the dynamic game. We use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept. A PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile and belief system. In a PBE, every agent's strategy should be a best response under the belief system, and the belief system depends on agents' strategy profile when there is signaling among agents. Therefore, the circular dependence between strategy profile and belief system makes it difficult to compute PBE. Using the common information among agents, we introduce a subclass of PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE), and provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. Such decomposition leads to a backward induction algorithm to compute CIB-PBE. We illustrate the sequential decomposition with an example of a multiple access broadcast game. We prove the existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games.