Shengwei Xu

Shengwei Xu, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng et al.

Sustainable monetization of Large Language Models (LLMs) remains a critical open challenge. Traditional search advertising, which relies on static keywords, fails to capture the fleeting, context-dependent user intents--the specific information, goods, or services a user seeks--embedded in conversational flows. Beyond the standard goal of social welfare maximization, effective LLM advertising imposes additional requirements on contextual coherence (ensuring ads align semantically with transient user intents) and computational efficiency (avoiding user interaction latency), as well as adherence to ethical and regulatory standards, including preserving privacy and ensuring explicit ad disclosure. Although various recent solutions have explored bidding on token-level and query-level, both categories of approaches generally fail to holistically satisfy this multifaceted set of constraints. We propose a practical framework that resolves these tensions through two decoupling strategies. First, we decouple ad insertion from response generation to ensure safety and explicit disclosure. Second, we decouple bidding from specific user queries by using ``genres'' (high-level semantic clusters) as a proxy. This allows advertisers to bid on stable categories rather than sensitive real-time response, reducing computational burden and privacy risks. We demonstrate that applying the VCG auction mechanism to this genre-based framework yields approximately dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR), as well as approximately optimal social welfare, while maintaining high computational efficiency. Finally, we introduce an "LLM-as-a-Judge" metric to estimate contextual coherence. Our experiments show that this metric correlates strongly with human ratings (Spearman's $ρ\approx 0.66$), outperforming 80% of individual human evaluators.

Yuxuan Lu, Shengwei Xu, Yichi Zhang et al.

Peer prediction mechanisms motivate high-quality feedback with provable guarantees. However, current methods only apply to rather simple reports, like multiple-choice or scalar numbers. We aim to broaden these techniques to the larger domain of text-based reports, drawing on the recent developments in large language models. This vastly increases the applicability of peer prediction mechanisms as textual feedback is the norm in a large variety of feedback channels: peer reviews, e-commerce customer reviews, and comments on social media. We introduce two mechanisms, the Generative Peer Prediction Mechanism (GPPM) and the Generative Synopsis Peer Prediction Mechanism (GSPPM). These mechanisms utilize LLMs as predictors, mapping from one agent's report to a prediction of her peer's report. Theoretically, we show that when the LLM prediction is sufficiently accurate, our mechanisms can incentivize high effort and truth-telling as an (approximate) Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Empirically, we confirm the efficacy of our mechanisms through experiments conducted on two real datasets: the Yelp review dataset and the ICLR OpenReview dataset. We highlight the results that on the ICLR dataset, our mechanisms can differentiate three quality levels -- human-written reviews, GPT-4-generated reviews, and GPT-3.5-generated reviews in terms of expected scores. Additionally, GSPPM penalizes LLM-generated reviews more effectively than GPPM.

Yichi Zhang, Shengwei Xu, David Pennock et al.

Eliciting reliable human feedback is essential for many machine learning tasks, such as learning from noisy labels and aligning AI systems with human preferences. Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize truthful reporting without ground truth verification by scoring agents based on correlations with peers. Traditional mechanisms, which ensure that truth-telling maximizes the expected scores in equilibrium, can elicit honest information while assuming agents' utilities are linear functions of their scores. However, in practice, non-linear payment rules are usually preferred, or agents' utilities are inherently non-linear. We propose stochastically dominant truthfulness (SD-truthfulness) as a stronger guarantee: the score distribution of truth-telling stochastically dominates all other strategies, incentivizing truthful reporting for a wide range of monotone utility functions. Our first observation is that no existing peer prediction mechanism naturally satisfies this criterion without strong assumptions. A simple solution -- rounding scores into binary lotteries -- can enforce SD-truthfulness, but often degrades sensitivity, a key property related to fairness and statistical efficiency. We demonstrate how a more careful application of rounding can better preserve sensitivity. Furthermore, we introduce a new enforced agreement (EA) mechanism that is theoretically guaranteed to be SD-truthful in binary-signal settings under mild assumptions, and empirically achieves the highest sensitivity among all known SD-truthful mechanisms.