Levent Aksoy

Mohammad Hasan Ahmadilivani, Levent Aksoy, Mohammad Eslami et al.

Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural networks have penetrated healthcare applications where real-time requirements and edge computing capabilities are essential. Gait analysis that detects abnormal steps to prevent patients from falling is a prominent problem for such applications. Given the extremely stringent design requirements in performance, power dissipation, and area, an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) enables an efficient real-time exploitation of LSTMs for gait analysis, achieving high accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, this work presents the first cross-layer co-optimized LSTM accelerator for real-time gait analysis, targeting an ASIC design. We conduct a comprehensive design space exploration from software down to layout design. We carry out a bit-width optimization at the software level with hardware-aware quantization to reduce the hardware complexity, explore various designs at the register-transfer level, and generate alternative layouts to find efficient realizations of the LSTM accelerator in terms of hardware complexity and accuracy. The physical synthesis results show that, using the 65 nm technology, the die size of the accelerator's layout optimized for the highest accuracy is 0.325 mm^2, while the alternative design optimized for hardware complexity with a slightly lower accuracy occupies 15.4% smaller area. Moreover, the designed accelerators achieve accurate gait abnormality detection 4.05x faster than the given application requirement.

Levent Aksoy, Muhammad Sohaib Munir, Sedat Akleylek

Over the years, many techniques have been introduced to protect integrated circuits (ICs) from hardware security threats that emerged in the globalized IC manufacturing supply chain, such as overproduction and piracy. However, most of these techniques have been rendered inefficient since they do not rely on provably secure algorithms. Moreover, the previously proposed techniques using cryptography algorithms lead to a significant increase in hardware complexity and are vulnerable to the removal and power analysis attacks. In this paper, we propose a compound IC protection mechanism that uses a lightweight cryptography algorithm with prominent logic locking and hardware obfuscation techniques. Experimental results show that the secure designs generated by the developed tool have significantly less hardware complexity when compared to those generated by previously proposed techniques using cryptography algorithms and are resilient to existing removal, algebraic, and logic locking attacks.

Levent Aksoy, Alexander Hepp, Johanna Baehr et al.

A finite impulse response (FIR) filter is a ubiquitous block in digital signal processing applications. Its characteristics are determined by its coefficients, which are the intellectual property (IP) for its designer. However, in a hardware efficient realization, its coefficients become vulnerable to reverse engineering. This paper presents a filter design technique that can protect this IP, taking into account hardware complexity and ensuring that the filter behaves as specified only when a secret key is provided. To do so, coefficients are hidden among decoys, which are selected beyond possible values of coefficients using three alternative methods. As an attack scenario, an adversary at an untrusted foundry is considered. A reverse engineering technique is developed to find the chosen decoy selection method and explore the potential leakage of coefficients through decoys. An oracle-less attack is also used to find the secret key. Experimental results show that the proposed technique can lead to filter designs with competitive hardware complexity and higher resiliency to attacks with respect to previously proposed methods.

Levent Aksoy, Quang-Linh Nguyen, Felipe Almeida et al.

This paper presents a high-level circuit obfuscation technique to prevent the theft of intellectual property (IP) of integrated circuits. In particular, our technique protects a class of circuits that relies on constant multiplications, such as filters and neural networks, where the constants themselves are the IP to be protected. By making use of decoy constants and a key-based scheme, a reverse engineer adversary at an untrusted foundry is rendered incapable of discerning true constants from decoy constants. The time-multiplexed constant multiplication (TMCM) block of such circuits, which realizes the multiplication of an input variable by a constant at a time, is considered as our case study for obfuscation. Furthermore, two TMCM design architectures are taken into account; an implementation using a multiplier and a multiplierless shift-adds implementation. Optimization methods are also applied to reduce the hardware complexity of these architectures. The well-known satisfiability (SAT) and automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) attacks are used to determine the vulnerability of the obfuscated designs. It is observed that the proposed technique incurs small overheads in area, power, and delay that are comparable to the hardware complexity of prominent logic locking methods. Yet, the advantage of our approach is in the insight that constants -- instead of arbitrary circuit nodes -- become key-protected.

Felipe Almeida, Levent Aksoy, Jaan Raik et al.

The interplay between security and reliability is poorly understood. This paper shows how triple modular redundancy affects a side-channel attack (SCA). Our counterintuitive findings show that modular redundancy can increase SCA resiliency.